Dreams without Illusions: The Bureaucratic Cholesterol, Administrative Corruption and the Future of a Real Democratic Middle East

“A president cannot defend a nation if he is not held accountable to its laws.”

― DaShanne Stokes

Introduction

The Middle East is a diverse region whose development possibilities have yet to be entirely realized. These countries benefit from a privileged geographic position located at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and Asia, a young and progressively educated population, and great potential in sectors, such as renewable energies, industry, tourism, and business development services.¹Over decades, Middle Eastern countries have executed reforms to upsurge economic openness, diversification, and private sector development; but this region now is in turmoil, as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen are in civil (proxy) wars, causing indescribable damage to human lives and physical infrastructure along with political unpredictability in Egypt, Tunisia, and Alegria.² As this region experiences a turbulent politico-economic transitional period, the enquiries related to the state’s affiliation with civil society, the marketplace, the public/private sector frontier, and administrative reform have become more important than ever before.³ Several Arab countries have Western mode administrative institutions that do not always sit squarely with non-Western cultural patterns, social structures, and individual behaviors. Values of better and effective governance including transparency, integrity, fairness, and accountability, are becoming increasingly prominent, raising expectations that will certainly change the relationship between citizens and the government, especially regarding public institutions.⁴

This article will not focus on the political processes, but rather the administration of the government’s affairs and the conditions required for operative governance, which can be understood as orderly legal rule and collective action to control corruption, especially the code of conduct technique. So, it emphasizes corruption as a rampant disease in the Middle East, especially in the field of public administration, defined as the variety of guiding general principles that regulate how governments administer their affairs. Public administration is defined as the diversity of structures, procedures and practice, and public sector reform regarding the diversity of public service delivery mechanisms (marketization, commercialization, privatization, and contracting out). It is also defined as the administrative reforms, the bureaucratic organizational change and procedural reform concerning corruption, personnel administration, budgeting, financial management, and e-government. Governance comprises all the processes of overriding, whether undertaken by the government/state, a market, a network, or over a social system; and whether through the laws, legal norms, power, or language of an organized society. Thus, it relates to the processes of communication and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, fortification, or reproduction of social norms and institutions. In other words, it could be described as the political processes that exist in and between formal institutions. A variety of entities (governing bodies) can govern whose responsibility and authority it is to make binding decisions in a given geopolitical system (such as a state) by establishing laws and rules. Part II deals with the linkage between corruption and democracy. Part III and IV emphasize the theoretical legal framework on what can be done in the war against corruption, and applies the framework to two case studies within the region, Egypt and Tunisia. The paper concludes by adopting the policy recommendations that should be taken to solve the corruption conundrum.

II. Corruption Conundrum: Is It a Prerequisite to the Contentment of the Right to Democracy?

Is there a worldwide common human right to democracy? Constitutions, laws, and international human rights documents answer that explicitly “yes.” The United States Constitution lays out its political system of representative government (system of governance).⁵In this respect, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provides that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”⁶ Furthermore, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, signed by the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1990, reads in Article 19 for equal protection under the law “without distinction between the ruler and the ruled” and the international right to resort to justice.⁷ Intrinsic in the right to democracy is that the representative government be free from corruption. Political scientists, along with legal scholars, defined corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of . . . pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private- regarding influence,” including bribery and embezzlement.⁸ Both international law norms and U.S. jurisprudence have underlined that the absence of corruption is indispensable to democracy. As stipulated in its Preamble, the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption was enacted because of “problems and threats posed by corruption to . . . undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law.”⁹

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, stated that “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”¹⁰ As is generally well-known, a trial does not bestow justice if the judge is bribed; a public official who acts to line his own pockets does not act in the community’s best interests, and an election is pointless if the outcome is fixed.¹¹ In other words, the absence of public integrity and accountability destabilizes an effective operative democracy.¹²The absence of corruption alone does not stimulate a democratic atmosphere, but true democracy cannot exist where corruption flourishes, as this has been revealed by quantitative analyses of corruption’s effect on society.¹³ For example, an inspection of corruption in Latin America determined that the perception of public corruption is as distinct and devastating in effect as its outcome per se. This perception creates a “culture of distrust”, nepotism, and cynicism towards public institutions.¹⁴ Likewise, a study of corruption in South Korea found that political corruption is the most relevant cause of the public’s distrust in a country’s political system.¹⁵ In this regard, a 2002 international study on corruption’s root causes concluded that political competition diminishes corruption because freedom of information and association restrict the opportunities for corrupt acts.¹⁶ Corruption “breaks the link between collective decision making and people’s powers to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy.”¹⁷

A. Defining Corruption

Perhaps like numerous individuals, it is important to think of corruption’s problems in terms of how they may destabilize democratic institutions. The great scholars of corruption underscore its effects more broadly than this. Judge John Noonan wrote an extended history of bribery,¹⁸ tracing it to periods, places, and institutions that were not at all democratic; and Professor Robert Klitgaard has written about the economic and developmental effects of corruption, again often in places that are not democratic.¹⁹

These two scholars differ in their perspective on corruption. Both recognize that corruption has a slightly unusual double meaning. The first definition in many dictionaries is purely ethical, referring to any conduct or individual that is debauched, perverted, or debased ethically.²⁰ The second concept is often more closely associated with fraudulent or, more narrowly, with the improper use of a position of trust for personal benefit (dishonesty).²¹ Klitgaard is most concerned with the practical values of betrayal of the trust that has been placed in an individual in giving him a specific position in business or government.²² Noonan highlights the far broader, moral meaning of being relatively corrupt.²³ Nevertheless, both focus on the giving and receiving of private or personal benefits in exchange for favored treatment by a public official who is supposed to be determining the issue without regard to his own private interests.²⁴ Covertly receiving private benefits to affect a decision that is supposed to be made in the interests of others and uninfluenced by private gain is corruption, and is not merely a problem of governments.²⁵ In this domain, a buying agent for a corporation may also be corrupt by demanding inducements to influence his purchasing decisions, as corruption is certainly not a problem solely of democracies.²⁶

In terms of Judge Noonan’s interest in morality, all these surroundings share certain ethically appropriate features. When a person who has been placed in a position of trust on the understanding that he will act on behalf of someone else’s interest and in accordance with certain understood criteria (legal norms), instead receives or demands private benefits with the understanding (knowingly) that these will influence his decision, there is a betrayal of trust;, there is deception and fraud; and there is a misuse of power.²⁷ A victim of the misuse of trust is whoever gave the individual the right to act on his behalf, and the victims of the misuse of power are those who are denied the opportunity to deal with an organization on honest terms.²⁸ These concepts are so basic that it is unsurprising to find that every nation prohibits bribery as a core form of dishonesty and immorality.²⁹

From the perspective of Professor Robert Klitgaard, the purposes of an organization that placed trust in a dishonest agent are defeated by that dishonesty.³⁰ Corruption is not unreliable with rapid growth as major nations in Asia, Latin America, and Europe have established, as businesses can come to recognize a corrupt regime. But corruption is inconsistent with carrying out purposes of an administration and good governance, which may conflict with the needs of wealthy players in the private sector.³¹ In the long run, it is inconsistent with innovation and modernization by businesses spurred on by competition, as illicit payments become an enticing substitute for lower prices or product innovation.³² The short of the matter is that even the most primitive and simple of public organizations cannot run without trust among its members. Generally, mutual cooperation requires trust, and actual efficient cooperation requires a willingness to commit oneself to enthusiastic pursuit of the objectives of the public office.³³ That trust and honesty cannot survive the payment of personal gains to an individual who has agreed to take part in the cooperative organization, and who has been given the power of others on the understanding that those benefits will be used exclusively for their purposes in order to induce him to divert the powers granted to pursue the quite different purposes of someone outside the office.³⁴ Bribery of its members is, consequently, a practice that every organization prohibits, and states enforce this proscription when dealing with genuine organizations where cooperation is to be fortified.³⁵

A word of caution is in order before leaving this most general area of collaboration. In real life, it is unbearable to wholly separate private motivations from the use of authority trusted for specific, non-personal purposes.³⁶ Not every bit of loyalty to a family member or a clan, not every hope for a future employment or a valued friendship, may be forced out of the concentrations of folks entrusted with authority for other specific tools.³⁷ So lines must be drawn, and diversified lines are drawn in different societies. That the precise location of the line is a subject of argument or even arbitrary, does not decline the general idea that we must prohibit payments envisioned to breach the trust on which cooperative activities depend.³⁸ B. Democracy and Corruption

In these contexts, where democracy is not decisively rooted, the question of corruption becomes: who does a democratic government in fact serve? President Abraham Lincoln of the United States spoke several years ago in the Gettysburg Address about a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people," and asked how long it can survive.³⁹ We are asking whether any other sort of democratic government can endure. A corrupt, democratic government is likely to look like it is for the rich and the well-connected, not a government by and for the people. If the choice to much of the population appears to be one between elected figures serving the interests of narrow but wealthy constituencies, or autocratic governments serving much broader interests, democracy is very much at risk.⁴⁰

Democracy is also more susceptible to corruption charges than other forms of government for two reasons. First, the freedom of press, speech, and political test that come with democracy permit opponents of a corrupt government to misuse public resources. “A military government or the government of a . . . [dictatorial] regime simply does not . . . [stand with] this.”⁴¹ “Second, democracies have the . . . [distinct] problem of funding . . . [luxurious] political activities” and “if they are not to be funded from tax revenues, they must be funded by private persons who will want something from the candidates they support.”⁴² Their discharge of a trust managed to pay for them by all of the people is unavoidably affected by their personal gain in raising the funds necessary to be elected.⁴³ This is a form of bribery, however disinclined we may be to use that term, and it demoralizes the support of elected governments in a way that has no application to other governments. Additionally, there is the question of whether it is harder or easier to curb corruption in a democracy. The people of every country hate corruption and feel cheated by it. The more a government is receptive to its citizens’ needs, the more likely the public officials will feel an offset to the temptations of corruption. Furthermore, the presence of a free press provides a vital mediator and indicator for public opinion, as it can discover and document corruption, and disclose it to sizable populations, which can be an influential deterrent.⁴⁴

In describing these relationships of corruption and democracy, one can argue that corruption may take place at high or low levels through a system. Corruption may be prevalent and systematic at whatever level it is functioning, or it may be intermittent and occasional.⁴⁵ Noticeably, the threat that corruption will generate cynicism, nepotism, suspicion, and ultimately citizen distrust not only of an administration but of the very manner by which governments are selected (democratic elections), depends upon which of these corruption areas are present. High- level corruption is far more dangerous to democracy than low-level corruption. So, “[i]f the highest levels are honest, citizens are more likely to pursue a change in administration to demand honesty at lower levels.”⁴⁶ Systemic corruption is far more risky to democracy than occasional and sporadic corruption, as it may change the entire attitude of a population, leaving the untrustworthy feeling as if they have been unwise and encouraging children as well as adults to accept cheating as a way of life. Systemic corruption cuts across key state institutions, runs from the top to the bottom, and is fundamentally political in nature. In recent decades, the dynamics of globalization and high information technologies have opened doors through which corrupt performs are able to spread from country to country. Stefes illustrates that in “Russia, one of the most economically and politically powerful” of the "systemically corrupt" countries, "organized crime penetrates businesses around the world," turning businesses into "money-laundering machines," generating "a different business ethic."⁴⁷ In the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, corruption was high on the list of complaints presented by demonstrators.⁴⁸“In the Maghreb in particular, concerns about the quality of governance, including the protection of rights, the rule of law, and corruption have long been voiced in tandem with calls for democracy.”⁴⁹ The 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index of the international anti-corruption organization, Transparency International , rates countries on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), and the Middle East and North African (MENA) region scores are poor especially in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon, and Egypt.⁵⁰ Thus, if the right to democracy is premised on an absence of political corruption, then the Arab Spring nations must effectively battle their cultures of corruption in order to realize that right. As of January 2019, the legacy of the 2011 Arab Spring remains unsettled. Just as John F. Kennedy was described as an “idealist without illusions,”⁵¹ the individuals of North Africa realized that the success of the Arab Spring will not be judged by the enunciation of lofty democratic standards in Tunis streets or Tahrir (Liberation) Square, but rather by whether those principles are translated into permanent, real democratic reforms.⁵²Tunisia and Egypt have celebrated the exit of dictators, but it is unclear whether the institutions in these countries are exercising a meaningful role in governance.⁵³ Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt have all taken steps to provide reparation for rooted corruption that has existed for decades at all levels of government; however, the redress must result in an inclusive reduction of corruption for democracy to be accomplished in these nations.⁵⁴

III. Whither Public Administration in the Middle East? Ethical Environment for Better Governance and Public Civil Service via Codes of Conduct

The introduction of appropriate Codes of Conduct and Ethics, to be effective, needs to be reinforced by a variety of other mechanisms, training, and managerial and political leadership. Today, in most countries, there are growing expectations from citizens, business leaders, and civil society that governments must establish and deliver developed standards of ethicality and integrity in civil service, government agencies (ministries and parastatals), and government per se (public administration).⁵⁵It has been argued that this expectation is the result of better- focused press, mass-media attention, public scrutiny, and growing demands by public citizens and civil society, whose members want to see an end to the corrupt performances and fraudulent acts of the past.⁵⁶Bearing in mind the important progress made recently in developing effective civil service ethics, codes of conduct, transparency mechanisms, integrity systems, and anti- corruption agencies, there is now a need to focus on areas relevant to the problems of internalizing integrity and ethics in democratic governments and the civil service.⁵⁷On the other hand, in the weak democracies, where corruption is widespread, top politicians who enhanced themselves illegitimately have strong inducements to cling to power by any means and avoid prosecution, thereby continuing to enrich themselves. In order to stay in power, corrupt leaders may seek to weaken democratic checks on their power by compelling political competition through electoral fraud, as well as purging the civil service and flagging regulatory agencies. These corrupt leaders often bypass formal institutions, which are meant to enable transparency in government spending and other decisions, while oversight agencies and the judiciary may be politicized or left weak. In some cases, state institutions are used as repressive mechanisms to ensure the continuation of the incumbent rule, going from the rule of law to the “rule by law.” These actions undermine democratic consolidation processes, preventing further democratization.⁵⁸

Codes of ethics are written to guide behavior and any final analysis of the influence of a code must include how well it affects behavior. Scholarly debate on codes revolves around whether more general codes are mere platitudes and whether more detailed codes entail behavior about which reasonable individuals can disagree.59 Also, modern current social psychological research powerfully proposes that codes can guide or encourage behaviors in developing countries that are critical to a functioning public service.⁶⁰ Codes are not intended for “bad” persons, but for the persons who want to act morally, as the corrupt person will seldom follow a code. Most people – particularly public servants – wanted ethical guidance in difficult or uncertain situations.⁶¹ The average person is not totally corrupt but often desirous, and sometimes confused, by what appears to be a moral path. This is emphasized by the fact that:

When the temptations are significant, when the price of adherence (in terms, for example, of the sacrifice involved to our interests) is high, when the social consequences of violation (harms to others) are relatively slight, when the costs of violation are low – under such circumstances it is easy to be led from doing just what you ought to do . . . .⁶²

To anticipate exact threats to ethics ideals and integrity values in the public sector, public social attention needs to be paid to systemic intimidations that could deteriorate adherence to core public sector moral values and commitment to good governance as well as to formulating the essential political and management responses.⁶³ According to the general principles of administrative law, strengthening the moral competence of civil servants and establishing mechanisms to support “professional ethics” is required for public officials. This can be done by adopting new techniques to institutionalize ethically competent decision making, providing unbiased advice to government, and creating an ‘ethical culture’ that promotes professional responsibility, self-discipline, and support for the rule of law.⁶⁴ Developing administrative practices and processes that support ethical philosophies and integrity requires actual implementation through, for instance, effective performance management practices that support the application of the moral values and ethical leadership set out in the civil service (and parastatal) codes of ethics.⁶⁵

Effective ethics codes are not simply a text; rather, they demonstrate the fundamental principles and values of a public service. These can include more legalistic guidelines, like restrictions on enhancing transparency and preventing conflicts of interest.⁶⁶ Also, codes can comprise values but the critical elements in the codes are the strong articulation of philosophies that are derived from morals. This distinction has its clearest conceptualization in the 18th century writings of Jeremy Bentham.⁶⁷ For him a principle was “a general law or rule that guides behaviour or decisions,” whereas values articulate “an aspiration of an ideal moral state.”⁶⁸ A more current clarification of this relationship in public service comes from Terry Cooper:

An ethical principle is a statement concerning the conduct or state of being that is required for the fulfillment of a value; it explicitly links a value with a general mode of action. For example, justice may be considered a significant value, but the term itself does not tell us what rule for conduct or state of society would follow if we include justice in our value system. We would need a principle of justice to show us what pattern of action would reflect justice as a value. A common form of the justice principle is “Treat equals equally and unequals unequally.” We might interpret this principle as meaning that if all adult citizens are politically equal, they should all have the same political rights and obligations. If one has the vote, all must have it.⁶⁹

Many modern public services recruit their code development through input from public officers. This generates an environment for contribution, as well as developes a sense of authenticity for a body of chief obligations and a context for those duties.⁷⁰ “The power of people in public office/service compared to those they serve is behind the vital notion that ‘public service is a public trust’ and explains why so many administrative and professional codes enforce special responsibilities on civil servants who, as temporary stewards, exercise public power and authority.”⁷¹ This assumes that the public official’s government is developing toward a democracy. In tyrannical states, or “kleptocracies”, these relations are all reversed, as public servants are permanent stewards who exercise authority on behalf of the rulers.⁷²

Democracy is not a state of being, it is an organic process. As part of this process, countries developing toward democracy develop more and more classy notions of values and principles. Even in highly developed countries, these values can rapidly become more extensive as a society is challenged with a corruption scandal.⁷³ Behavior that was previously considered adequate is condemned when viewed through the lens of this principle. This lens relocates the action often as intolerable behavior from one who is a temporary steward of the public interest.⁷⁴ Although often viewed as a “state” problem, it happens in any public organization, including multilaterals.⁷⁵ There are a comprehensive series of moral values that must be intrinsic in a public service within a democracy. These include values that go beyond individual behavior and address issues of the moral culture within organizations.⁷⁶

It has been argued by legal scholars and political scientists that some particular strategies should be considered, including: (a) actual effective legislations which require public officials to justify their official decisions (e.g., freedom of information law); (b) management attitudes that encourage all public officials and civil servants to deal with corruption and immoral acts when they encounter it ‘whistleblower’ protection laws to protect suitable ‘public interest disclosures’ of official’s misconducts; (c) ethics audits to recognize risks to the integrity processes (financial management, tendering, recruitment and promotion, dismissal and discipline); (d) new Human Resource Management policies, like ethical ‘under-performance’ with disciplinary processes, merit based promotion and recruitment, along with antidiscrimination protections; (e) training and development in the code of conduct’s content (e.g., ethical management ideals, the non- misuse of power, and the requirements of professional responsibility); and (f) effective external and internal complaint and redress procedures.⁷⁷

Now, it is generally recognized that meaningful and enforceable ethical codes that are linked to systemic practices and procedures–based on law, and backed by managerial leadership and high-level political commitment–and ongoing ‘professional ethics’ training, are indispensable.⁷⁸

The major problem for executing effective codes of conduct in Middle Eastern countries remains that no law or code will be of much value if the public officials lack the technical competence to recognize ethical problems; they do not know what standards their institutions expects of them; or (worst of all) if they do not consider it to be in their interests, personally or professionally, to take a stand for transparency, integrity and against corruption.⁷⁹ Codes of ethics are best regarded as a general statement of ‘core values,’ which define the professional role of the civil service, as they set out broad high-level principles as integrity, accountability, trustworthiness, etc.—but give little attention to how these principles are to be applied in specific circumstances.⁸⁰

It should be noted that externally, a code serves several significant purposes, as compliance (Legislation: i.e., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for instance) requires individuals serving on boards and organizational leaders of public companies to apply and execute codes or explain why they have not.⁸¹ Also, marketing is vital. A code serves as a public statement of what the public organization stands for and its duty to high standards and the right conduct.⁸² Risk mitigation also added, as public organizations with codes of conduct and who follow other defined steps. For example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines, can reduce the financial risks associated with government fines for moral misconduct by indicating they have made a “good faith effort” to prevent illegal acts.⁸³

Most modern public offices or civil service ethical laws or codes of conduct endorse the following minimum set of principles:

(a) Serving the Public Interest (Public Good)

Public officials along with civil employees are anticipated to preserve and reinforce the public’s trust and confidence in the government by indicating the highest standards of professional competence, efficacy and effectiveness; upholding the Constitution, legislation, and regulations; and always seeking to advance the public good of the community.⁸⁴

(b) Transparency and Integrity

Under government policy, civil servants are expected to use their powers and resources for the public good. They should be held accountable for their decisions and be prepared to justify their actions.⁸⁵ They should act solely in the public interest, without consideration of their private or personal interests. Since public office is considered a public trust, the improper use of a public service position for private advantage (conflict of interests) is regarded as a serious breach of duty and could be a criminal offense in various countries’ legal systems.⁸⁶

• Right of Protected Disclosure of Official Misconduct (‘Whistleblower’ Protection)

In terms of improving accountability and fostering the fight against administrative corruption, some countries have enacted legislation to establish a right whereby an individual may make a protected ‘public interest disclosure’ of any suspected or actual corruption or misconduct by a public official. The main task of the “whistleblower” protection provisions are to sustain a reasonable and effective balance regarding the desirable disclosure of official wrongdoing by protectingthosewhomakedisclosuresagainstactsofretaliationorrevenge.⁸⁷ Itshouldbenoted that reprisal may be defined as an act of misbehavior if the individual is a public official or a breach of the relevant criminal law if the person is a private citizen.⁸⁸ Legally speaking, whistleblower protection laws require government agencies to provide suitable and effective administrative procedures for making a public interest disclosure, and guarantee that the identity of the discloser is kept confidential to the maximum extent likely consistent with the operative investigation of the disclosure. Moreover, government institutions are required to offer a proper and effective procedure for ensuring that this individual is protected from retaliation or revenge activities.⁸⁹

Several countries have customarily adopted strict statutory controls on the management and expenditure of public funds to control public expenditure, and minimize corruption and the misappropriation of public funds.⁹⁰ Most of these measures are overseen by an independent auditing institution, in addition to a Public Accounts Committee, adopted by some parliaments to intensify the government’s budget oversight.⁹¹ For regulatory reform, the elimination of needless administrative ‘red tape’ or discretionary bureaucracy is endorsed by OECD countries. These changes could substantially contribute to reducing the governmental cost by decreasing the size of the public administration apparatus and the compliance costs to the community.⁹² However, the most important aspect of this reform is eliminating petty corruption by reducing the administrative procedures by bureaucrats to halt bureaucrats from taking fraudulent actions including, bribes, kickbacks, and ‘facilitation payments.’⁹³

Integrity tests are one of the most significant mechanisms to track the impact of the code of conduct and how it operates by a public institution. The employee’s agency or an anti-corruption body employs the test to detect individuals who are prepared to accept a bribe, or other inducement, to act corruptly by doing (or not doing) something that they are required to do in their position.⁹⁴ A relatively recent development in this regard is the introduction of formal requisites that all citizens in their official transactions with public bodies and public officials are required to ask for legitimate and honest acts without any corrupt intent by offering inducements to civil servants improperly, for example.⁹⁵ Thus, under this legal commitment, citizens are expected to refrain from committing any deceptive, deceitful or fraudulent behavior, and to report any actual or suspected corrupt activity or misconduct to the authorized body.⁹⁶ This helps the auditing and recordkeeping bodies, along with anti-corruption agencies, to exercise a thorough investigation and take serious measures over corrupt public individuals that misuse the office or try to undermine the implementation of the code of ethics.⁹⁷

Middle Eastern countries should now re-consider the effect of the past and current human resources management practices on the ethical climate of their civil services. A public institution that fails to implement its ethical codes through adequate training, effective managerial leadership, and enforcement of robust disciplinary actions will not be able to battle corruption and will be incapable of providing services to the public.⁹⁸ In most modern civil services practices, promotion and recruitment is based on merit procedures, not on nepotism (political or family connections), and protected by law.⁹⁹ Legally speaking, patronage and nepotism in public office is generally forbidden by law and protected by effective independent regulatory mechanisms.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, civil service discipline (sanctions) and management practices must be objective, fair, and reasonable, as directors and managers are expected to be trained to provide accurate assessments on the civil servant’s performance.¹⁰¹ It should be mentioned that public officials will not abide by the codes of conduct if they acknowledge–routinely–major breaches of the code ignored by the leadership of the institution, therefore, administrative executives–including political leadership–must set the model.¹⁰²

(c) Legitimacy and Fairness

Public officials are required to administer the laws and regulations, and to exercise administrative power on behalf of the government, the parliament, or other such competent authority.¹⁰³ That authority should be exercised lawfully, independently, and without fear or favor, for its suitable public purpose as determined, civil employees should make decisions and act in a fair and equitable manner, without bias, discrimination, or prejudice, bearing in mind only the merits of the matter, and respecting citizen’s rights.¹⁰⁴

(d) Efficiency, Effectiveness and Awareness

Agents and public government employees are required to serve the genuine interests and needs of the government, other civil servants, and all citizens, in a timely manner, with care, esteem, and courtesy; along with obtaining the best value for public assets installed in or through public management and to avoid waste and misuse or misappropriation of public assets or funds.¹⁰⁵

Generally, within the field of civil service, the service-delivery developed by civil service agencies and parastatal–and administrative law–progressively underscore service and accountability as the key aspects of civil service reform. Several fundamental moral ideologies and explicit attitudes and practices have been established as follows:

1. Service: Citizens have rights to goods and services of several sorts and public servants are expected to focus mainly on serving the public citizens, and the government, avoiding any private interests or personal advantages. Redundant administrative obstructions to active service delivery, (“bureaucracy”, or “red tape-ism”), should be recognized and removed;¹⁰⁶

2. Accountability: Decisions made by civil employees and public officials should be transparent, justified on reasonable grounds, and accessible at any time,¹⁰⁷ and

3. Complaints: Public officers on behalf of their agencies required to provide operative mechanisms in which citizens – and the business community – can lodge complaints about the agency’s performance and receive appropriate remedies. It should be noted that administrative complaints procedures should be internally monitored by each institution to ensure that systems are rechecked, and their performance is improved.¹⁰⁸

There is no silver bullet for battling administrative corruption. Numerous countries have made momentous progress in curbing it; yet, practitioners are always on the lookout for solutions and evidence of impact. Legal scholars argue that there are five ways that citizens and governments can make progress in the fight against administrative corruption, especially in public service:

1- End Impunity: Operative law and regulation enforcement is vital to guarantee the corrupt are punished and break the cycle of impunity, or freedom from sentence or loss. Successful enforcement methods are supported by a strong legal framework, law enforcement branches, and an independent and actual court system. Civil society can sustain the process with initiatives such as Transparency International’s Unmask the Corrupt campaign.¹⁰⁹

2- Promote Transparency and Information Access: Countries successful at reducing administrative corruption have a long tradition of government openness, press freedom, transparency, and access to information. Access to information increases the receptiveness of government bodies, while concurrently having a positive outcome on the levels of public participation in a country.¹¹⁰

3- Empower Public Citizens: Firming citizens’ demand for anti-corruption and empowering them to hold the government accountable is a justifiable and maintainable perspective that builds mutual trust between citizens and government. For instance, community monitoring initiatives have in some cases contributed to the recognition of corruption, reduced outflows of funds, and improved the quantity and quality of public services.¹¹¹

4- Reform Public Administration and Finance Management: Reforms focusing on improving financial management and strengthening the role of auditing agencies have in several countries achieved greater impact than public sector reforms on curbing corruption, especially against bribery, embezzlement, and misappropriation of public funds along with peddling-in-influence. One such reform is the disclosure of budget information, which averts waste and misuse of resources and any fraudulent criminal activities.¹¹²

5- Prevent and Close International Loopholes: Without access to the international financial system, corrupt public servants universally would not be able to launder and hide the proceeds of looted state assets. Major financial centers urgently need to put in place ways to stop their banks and cooperating offshore financial centers from absorbing illicit flows of money and advance the field of asset recovery. In this regard, The European Union recently approved the fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which requires EU member-states to create registers of the beneficial owners of companies established within their borders. However, the directive does not require these registers to be made public.¹¹³ These standards proposed by the general principles of public law – especially administrative law – not only govern how public officials shall communicate and serve the public, but also they may be used to enforce standards of ethical conduct by prohibiting bribe-seeking, taking inducements or kickbacks, and setting up accountability by providing redress for complaints, and procedural fairness via demanding “due process” and rule of law in decision and policy making. In other words, improving citizens’ access to “quality of service” by government agencies is likely to have the effect of making government and the civil service more transparent and accountable.¹¹⁴ In this respect, maladministration – which is widespread in the Arab World – refers to the making of an official decision in a manner which is in contradiction to the law, arbitrary, unreasonable, without any reasonable ground, lacking its merits or procedural fairness (corruptly).¹¹⁵ Maladministration could be an abuse of office or misusing public office for private gain, which is the standard definition of corruption.¹¹⁶ In several countries, official decisions affected by maladministration should be reviewed independently through an ombudsman apparatus, or administrative appeals tribunal (court), and fixed and civil servants responsible for it should be disciplined by their employers.¹¹⁷

Moreover, besides the establishment of anti-corruption agencies, under laws that protect public citizens for reporting corruption several nations have established and enforced a higher obligation on public officials (civil employees) for a mandatory reporting of all suspected corruption and official misconduct cases, including momentous breaches of the codes of conduct.¹¹⁸ Some governments—not mostly in the Middle East—provide citizens with a qualified right to access any official information as a constitutional universal human right held according to freedom of information legislation.¹¹⁹ It should be mentioned that this right does not operate when the responsible authority determines that the whole or partial disclosure of the official information is related to the national public interest, national economy, or national security.¹²⁰ In the same vein, citizens have an unqualified right under law to be advised of the reasons for any official decision of which they are directly the subject. This includes the right to be advised, at the time of the decision and in writing, of the evidence and other information considered by the decision maker, and of the procedure, if any, for having the decision reviewed.¹²¹ Public citizens are entitled by law to due process guarantees (protections of procedural fairness) regarding official decisions that affect them directly, which means that they have the right to a hearing session about the matter before any final decision is made; and the right to know the allegation (or the case) to be defended justly and impartially.¹²²

Thus, Codes of Conduct or Codes of Behavior are intended to anticipate and avert certain precise types of behavior; e.g. conflict of interest, self-dealing, kickbacks, and inappropriate actions. While conduct codes can be brief, most often they are justly lengthy and detailed, as the rationale for the detailed scope of this sort of code is that it is essential to both protect the employee while at the same time protecting the government’s reputation.¹²³ Most codes of conduct focus on the “do nots” rather than on affirmative obligations; they detail specific acts that public workers are not to engage in.¹²⁴

In terms of public administration, both ethics codes and standards of conduct must have a context. One of the most imperative elements is an effective system of public administration. This does not mean that a complicated bureaucratic public administration system must exist before these codes can be effective.¹²⁵ In some cases, the codes have been used as a compound to build a modern public administration system based on a merit system. “Public administrators must believe that they are part of a profession with professional standards.”¹²⁶ Within successful public administration regimes there is a self-motivated focus on socialization and communication to strengthen the notion of public service.¹²⁷ This can include the of a special oath when entering public office to on what is expected of public officials.¹²⁸ Also, it can include special recognition (awards and ceremonies), as well as “special” salary schemes, job security, benefits and even status. Socialization and rewards of public servants has been a concern of theorists for decades. In the end, much of the socialization is left to directors, who must model and articulate the expectations within the organization.

IV. What can be Done to End Administrative (Institutional) Corruption? Is it Possible?

Every country is exclusive in its forms of corruption and in the institutions and powers it has accessible for dealing with them. Every democratic nation is unique in the support that the battle against corruption enjoys from high public officials and from the public at large. Still, there is logic to the problem of a democracy combating corruption that is general wherever the corruption may be. To recognize the problem a democracy faces in monitoring corruption, it is a valuable exercise to visualize trying to generate a setting for corrupt activities so perfect that even a decently honest person would be tempted severely.¹²⁹ To get the huge bribe, we need high stakes for personal interests and an understanding that those stakes must turn on a public decision by a single individual. So, if the decision is made by the simultaneous decision of a number of individuals, the rewards will diminish and the risk will grow.¹³⁰ For safety from detection, the decision must either be so discretionary, so deficient in standards, that the purchased choice will not look mistrustful, or it must be hidden in the obscurity that characterizes some of the lowest levels of governmental choices.¹³¹

The main task, in attacking corruption and fraudulent actions, is to eradicate as many of these conditions as possible, and part of the trouble is that they strengthen each other. It may not be possible to change the mores of a public organization or of the government without reducing the opportunities for corrupt advantage. But it is politically problematic to take the hard steps essential to diminish the opportunities for corruption so long as cynicism smothers social demands for honesty.¹³² The job of the corruption combatant is to deal with both of these conditions concurrently by making visible the corruption that will outrage the citizenry in a democracy, and, with the support of that public reaction, bringing cases that show that corruption is not safe.¹³³ Accordingly, corruption can and should be addressed instantaneously in four different areas. The first two are the foremost ways of attempting to deal with corruption, but each of them entails substantial changes in what might otherwise be the preferred way of conducting the business of government. First, market conditions can be fashioned to diminish the private stakes that turn on the decision of any single person.¹³⁴ Second, government operations can be transformed to decrease the discretion exercised by public officials.¹³⁵ Third, changing the government's public and organizational approaches to self-dealing. Lastly, as a fourth alternative, the creation of management and law enforcement policies aiming to make corruption apparent -- despite desires to suppress corruption -- could instantaneously address this issue.¹³⁶

In terms of policies aimed at making corruption visible, it should be noted that the central concept behind both management and law enforcement strategies is coming to comprehend the difficulties of engaging in corruption secretly in different settings. To address corruption activities, a civil servant and a private party must identify each other as potential corrupt partners, find a way to reach an agreement or a promise, and then deliver what each has promised without being detected. Each of these steps can be enormously complicated, for in each there are weaknesses to detection.¹³⁷ In the same vein, the processes that are required to market corruption have vulnerabilities attached to them. Exploiting those vulnerabilities, once recognized, is the key focus of any law enforcement or management strategy to control corrupt acts. ¹³⁸ Identifying these vulnerabilities to detection requires coming to comprehend, in various settings, what tradition or practicality is likely to dictate the mechanics of three things: finding corrupt partners, making payments, and delivering what is obtained each in an inconspicuous mode.¹³⁹

In this respect, the corrupt deal also depends upon the area of governmental activity. Beyond mere misuse of government property, the methods of carrying out corruption -- and vulnerability to exposure -- are likely to differ in cases of police corruption. These methods of corruption include the following: sale of exemptions from regulation or tax collection; grease payments to speed a slow process; corrupt procurement; sale of access to inside information; legislation and judical rulings. ¹⁴⁰ So, different policies are required depending upon the various cases and ways in which corruption takes place, as the plans should depend upon how vulnerable to detection each type of corrupt business is in the tasks of finding corrupt partners, making payments, and delivering what is purchased.¹⁴¹

Furthermore, management controls are essential, as management strategies have the advantage of allowing the chief to put into place systems that will make uncommon decisions, illegal benefits, or the agreements that link them, more perceptible.¹⁴² There is a contradiction concerning the idea of battling corruption by management change in internal operating systems. A deceitful public official who is prepared to take a bribe in exchange for forgoing the obligations he has assumed will also be eager to disregard or circumvent record keeping, review, or other management requirements designed to make any corrupt activity more visible.¹⁴³

In the same vein, a set of institutional and political structures of support are essential to carry out either a law enforcement or a management policy against corruption. Making use of law enforcement and management procedures, based on an analysis of the corruption’s vulnerability to detection in various settings, depends on four conditions being satisfied: (a) the necessary substantive laws indicating illegitimate conduct and the necessary legal rules generating preventive measures, like a rule requiring sealed bids or forbidding ex parte meetings with judges; (b) the desired management, auditing (recordkeeping), and investigative powers finding out if the practical laws are being complied with; (c) the needed institutional structures carrying out the application of the laws; and (d) sufficient common political support for battling corruption persuading elected leaders at a high enough level to confront it–and these deserve special attention regarding the relationship of corruption with democracy.¹⁴⁴

Further, dedicated police units must enhance internal investigative units as one of the imperative checks on their vigor and integrity. Additionally, only a police unit may carry on an investigation outside of a public association, which involves inspecting the doings of the private parties involved in corruption.¹⁴⁵ As anti-corruption laws are hard to interpret, anti-corruption investigations are essentially more invasive, and hence, more difficult and delicate than investigations in which there is a victim to complain. ¹⁴⁶ A dedicated police corruption unit is likely to develop an esprit de corps that will produce the energy required to endure interest over time. The members of these units mainly need protection against the revenge of powerful political figures, as well as specialized training.¹⁴⁷

The most serious problem in every country—especially the developing ones—is that public prosecutors are alleged to be heavily involved with the potential goals of their investigations. Thus, they are suspected of either preferring friends among the powerful or unethically directing opponents of the powerful.¹⁴⁸ Besides, to the extent the prosecuting attorney succeeds in exemplifying public demands to pursue and punish the corrupt, the prosecutor becomes a prominent political figure, adding to the doubts of his incentives.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, to reliably assure to the public that a prosecutor is ready to bring cases against the powerful and to battle pressure to bring unwarranted cases against the opponents of the powerful.¹⁵⁰ In terms of the adequate judicial (court) system, criminal prosecutions are vital to assure the integrity of a system, regarding high-level officials, and they depend upon court systems that are adequate and appropriately independent to try major figures.¹⁵¹ In developing countries, neither capacity nor independence could be assumed, and the result is that any such trial would someway get overdue and blocked along the way and would doubtfully lead to a guilty verdict even when obviously warranted by the evidence.¹⁵² However, they must be pursued or the anticorruption system will lack reliability. If the promotion of judges in a career system or future political appointment in a system that chooses its judges in that way clearly depends upon the favor of those who are being tried, the results will also lack trustworthiness and neutrality. ¹⁵³

V. Little by Little, the Camel Climbs into the Pot: Moving Toward a Good Governance in Post-Arab Spring: Case Studies (Egypt and Tunisia)

1. Egypt

On January 25, 2011, extensive demonstrations began against the regime of then President Hosni Mubarak and on February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned.¹⁵⁴ Also in February 2011, Egypt’s attorney general and top public prosecutor notified the United States and other governments around the globe that Mubarak was supposed to have concealed hundreds of billions of dollars in cash, gold, assets, and other state-owned valuables, using multifaceted business schemes to divert the assets to offshore corporations and personal accounts.¹⁵⁵ In terms of fighting corruption, the 12-page “Request for Judicial Assistance,” written in Arabic, was the first step in civil forfeiture proceedings to recover assets embezzled by the Mubarak regime belonging to Egyptian citizens .¹⁵⁶ More than seventy people along with legal scholars submitted requests for asset recovery, and unfortunately nothing happened till the moment.¹⁵⁷ The document illustrated that Mubarak’s sons, as skilled businessmen who deployed the country’s financial system, laundered their unlawful proceeds through off-shore front companies.¹⁵⁸ It further “alleges that the Mubaraks ‘seized public monies and partnered with businessmen, investors, importers and exporters by force to realize profit without basis other than that they are the sons of the president.’”¹⁵⁹ Additionally, the document asserts that Mubarak’s sons and their partners committed embezzlement by purchasing “one of the debts of Egypt for 35% of its value and then collected the full 100% value from the Egyptian state budget.”¹⁶⁰

In the meantime, the specter of corruption endures to haunt the country. Prior to Mubarak’s exile, Egypt was described – and even still is – as “a state where wealth fuels political power and political power buys wealth.”¹⁶¹ WikiLeaks documents, published by The Washington Post, show that 2006 privatization deals and attempts by the State Department to build a market economy under Mubarak only amplified opportunities for graft: “[t]he privatization and economic opening of recent years have created new opportunities for ‘vertical corruption’ at upper levels of government affecting state resources.”¹⁶² The current government claims that it is proceeding with thoughtful speed towards a civilian democracy and battling corruption.¹⁶³ Addressing the legacy of corruption under Mubarak and others will remain a priority for Egyptians and a basis for skepticism towards the new political order and economic stability.¹⁶⁴

Thus, corruption has several features on the national level, all seen in Egypt, like, accumulating citizen’s economic encumbrances as consumers; negligence on the administrative level, particularly to public funds; tendency to link proficiency standards to illegitimate gains; and a public lack of respect for the government, laws, rules, and norms.¹⁶⁵ The Administrative Prosecution Authority presented a recent study in its annual report on the causes of the spread of bribery and administrative corruption in Egypt and effective ways to eliminate it. The report mentioned “poor moral and religious education; lack of [effective] supervision [monitoring] and follow up; delays in the adjudication of disciplinary sentences for bribery crimes in a manner that does not achieve public and private deterrence, and [the] poor salaries of public employees [along with] the large number of services accomplished by a limited number of employees.”¹⁶⁶ Also, the Central Auditing Organization (CAO) has worked to oversee the accounts and general performance of government institutions, along with the monetary fines under Law 144 of 1988. The agency’s authority covers the state’s administrative units, local governments, public sector companies, joint public-private companies with at least 25% state ownership, labor unions and professional syndicates, political parties, state- or party-owned media conglomerates, and other agencies whose regulations stipulate CAO oversight.¹⁶⁷ This means that CAO’s reports give insight into the state’s administrative performance and the level of corruption within public agencies and corporations. The Egyptian president has a good deal of influence over the CAO through the right to appoint its head, but the CAO enjoys some autonomy, as Article 20 of Law 144 of 1988 stipulates its head cannot be removed from his position during his first four years.¹⁶⁸ In addition to reporting financial violations to various government entities – whether the presidency, parliament, or ministries – the CAO sends its reports on alleged graft to the Attorney General and other agencies with a broader mandate to conduct investigations, as the Administrative Control Authority.

According to the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, The Central Auditing Organization is “responsible for monitoring the funds of the State, the funds of the State public and independent legal persons and other authorities as specified by Law; as well as being responsible for monitoring the implementation of the State budget and independent budgets and for auditing its final accounts.”¹⁶⁹

Reports of Transparency International confirm an escalation in the wasting of public funds and the retreat of the government’s role in fighting corruption, including embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, seizure, bribery, and forgery. Administrative corruption can be seen within the private sector through favoritism for those close to the regime, such as special benefits or their domination of a number of central projects or through getting simplified loans with no commercial guarantees; privatization; one report named “Corruption in Municipalities . . . Lack of Conscious and Lack of Monitoring” issued on February 26, 2008, by the Forum for Development and Human Rights Dialogue (FDHRD) stated that “during 2007, the amount of squandered funds reached EGP 454 million and that the amount of embezzled money in municipalities reached EGP 14 million”; the system of assessing assets, properties, and lands owned by these corporations, banks; the credit system; and trafficking money abroad via the authorized banking channels.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, in the agricultural sector, there were various types of wrongdoings starting with cancer-causing herbicides and the ruin of several vital commodities in the Egyptian economy.¹⁷¹Also, Law No.62 of 1975 on illicit gains requires Parliament members to file asset disclosure forms. According to Article 5, a judicial committee is formed to inspect asset disclosure procedures.¹⁷² The Illicit Enrichment Apparatus (“IEA”) supports these committees by receiving asset disclosure forms and asking for explanations about complaints, and has the right to ask the ACA to investigate cases of alleged illicit enrichment.¹⁷³

Egypt with its strong centralized regime possesses elaborate and extensive criminal laws, including corruption and fraudulent performances. Examples include proscriptions on bribery, which is usually committed by a public employee, a clergy member, a director, or a member of a board of directors. Bribery could take place in a corporation, an association, a syndicate, an institution, or even an organization legally carrying out public interest.¹⁷⁴ Other examples include prohibitions on non-justified illicit enrichment, abuse of authority, peddling in influence, money laundering, tax evasion, and so on. There are several other statutes regulating work in various sectors, such as the Central Bank Law and Banking Systems No. 120 of 1975 (and its presidential decrees concerning confidentiality of bank accounts and credit law), the Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992, and the Incentives and Investment Guarantees Law No. 8 of 1997. They launch monitoring systems and regulatory procedures relatively to fight corruption. These prohibitions also establish a system for contracting the administrative bodies based on transparency through Law No.89 of 1998 on bids and tender offers (Public Procurement).¹⁷⁵ Also, Law No.62 of 1975 concerning Illicit Enrichment; Law No.5 of 1991 on Civil Leadership Positions in the State Administrative System; Law No.127 of 1981 on Government Auditing; Law No. 53 of 1973 on the Utilization and Management of Public Funds and their Protection Against Corruption; Government Accountability Act No. 1127 of 1981, which sets the rules by which the administrative apparatus is to abide, in implementing the state’s budget; Law No.144 of 1988 establishing the Central Auditing Authority; Law No.80 of 2002 on Money Laundering and its amendments; Law No.35 of 1984 on the Judicial Authority; and Law No.117 of 1958 concerning Administrative Prosecution Authority, all involve attacking corruption.¹⁷⁶

These laws are broad and widely applicable to civil servants in all government bodies including municipalities, governorates, and ministries. They forbid various sorts of misconduct by public officials and are supplemented by many decrees and regulations governing public officials’ conduct in the government.¹⁷⁷ More significantly, when selecting the legal reform strategy to fight corruption, the following factors should be considered: the credible legal framework should rely upon the current international standards and norms and to fit the particular circumstances of the country; the value (core) of the rule of law prevalent in a country; and the institutional resources available to design the strategy. The legal framework should integrate provisions correlated with the prevention of corrupt practices, enable relevant institutions to combat corruption, and cover both disciplinary and penal matters.¹⁷⁸ The Egyptian Constitution reads that:

the state is committed to fighting corruption, and the competent control bodies and organizations are identified by law. Competent oversight bodies and organizations commit to coordinate with one another in combating corruption, enhancing the values of integrity and transparency in order to ensure sound performance of public functions, preserve public funds, and develop and following up on the national strategy to fight corruption in collaboration with other competent control bodies and organizations, in the manner organized by law.¹⁷⁹

Thus, administrative corruption is an obstacle for public service in Egypt. Public servants often encounter the following forms of corruption: bribery, embezzlement, tampering with official documents, and extortion.¹⁸⁰ A culture of nepotism and favoritism has tainted Egypt’s economy and its investment climate. A poor legal framework and a prevalent culture of corruption leave businesses and public offices reliant on strong connections and the use of wasta (middlemen) to operate, and well-connected businesses enjoy privileged treatment. It should be noted that Egypt’s Penal Code criminalizes several forms of corruption such as active and passive bribery and abuse of office, but existing legislation is erratically enforced, leading government officials to act with impunity. Facilitation payments and gifts are an established part of “getting things done,” despite these practices being criminalized under Egyptian law.¹⁸¹

Egypt’s public services sector carries a high corruption risk for business. Petty corruption, bribery, embezzlement, and tampering with official documents are pervasive within local government offices; particularly when trying to obtain government approvals and licenses.¹⁸² Inefficient government bureaucracy is the key cited problematic factor for public office’s corruption. Egypt’s regulatory system is not sufficiently transparent, and despite attempts at reform, entrenched bureaucratic and private interests have resisted change.¹⁸³ However, accounting, legal and regulatory standards are generally transparent and in line with international norms. The high degree of centralization of administration in Egypt, when combined with a lack of fiscal control of local budget, have led to many opportunities for corruption at the local level. The tax administration carries a temperately high corruption risk for business investing in Egypt.¹⁸⁴ There is a high risk of corruption when dealing with Egypt’s customs administration; as corporations indicate that irregular payments and bribes happen regularly during import and export procedures, non-satisfaction with the time-predictability and efficiency of the clearance process constitutes a burden on free trade.¹⁸⁵

Corporations face a high risk of corruption in the procurement sector, as businesses believe that public funds are often preoccupied to individuals and companies due to corruption, and perceive favoritism to be widespread among procurement officials for securing a governmental contract.¹⁸⁶ It should be mentioned that Egypt receives a medium score on compliance concerning transparency, efficiency, and uniformity indicators, and a low score on compliance with competition and integrity indicators in the public procurement sector; this is mainly due to the low trust of businesses in the transparent execution of procurement processes.¹⁸⁷ Indeed, procurement legislations are not effectually implemented and evidence suggests that contracting entities apply only minimal standards of transparency in the procurement process, further heightening the risks of corruption in the sector. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive law governing public procurement as it is regulated primarily by Law No. 89/1998 on bids.

Public officials are subject to financial disclosure laws upon taking and leaving office. The legislation on the Regulation of Prohibition of Conflict of Interest bars public officials from holding any interest in areas over which they exercise power. In this regard, public law scholars suggested the following factors should be taken into account to eradicate this phenomena: (a) increasing the minimum wage of employees to guarantee a decent living standards – and the state has made great strides in this direction; (b) activating internal control systems and supervisory responsibility; (c) having employees deal with the public only when necessary; (d) increasing penalties for such crimes to reach dismissal or deprivation of pension, and (e) ensuring the efficiency of security and electronic devices.

Conceivably, today in Egypt, we need to employ our political imaginations in which fighting against corruption becomes an integral part of the draft political reformer. But more than that, what we need currently, is for integrity to become the basis for moral legitimacy of governance systems. As legitimacy will be supported and shaded by both constitutional legitimacy and political legitimacy and feasibly add to them. A long time ago, the Egyptian People’s Assembly ratified the UNCAC--which means, under Article 151 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, it is an integral part of the Egyptian legal system. UNCAC’s ratification acquires binding legal force requiring implementation, on the procedural level and the level of prevention policies, and the realization of transparency, integrity, and accountability standards.¹⁸⁸ It is true that the UNCAC raises a sequence of concerns in terms of negotiating the national sovereignty of the state. Both law and political will are crucial in any policy to fight corruption, as a social vision is required, and the existence of that vision will pave the ground for the rule of law.¹⁸⁹ The very sustenance of free market exchange and competition depends on basic institutions that can endorse and distribute property rights, preserve the rule of law, and control anti-competition, conflict of interest, fraud, and corruption. In short, market-making proved to be the equivalent of state- making in the case of transitional economies.¹⁹⁰ Egypt did not take this track and the weakness of institutional arrangement refers to the situation where the state has no capability to uphold equal property rights, enforce the law (it even interrupts it systematically), or govern the irregularities of information and power misdeeds.

2. Tunisia

On January 14, 2011, after ruling Tunisia for more than 22 years, Zine el‘Abidine Ben ‘Ali relinquished the presidency and fled to Saudi Arabia in the face of nationwide protests. Political tyranny, corruption, unemployment, and rule of law violations were the key inspiring factors for the protests.¹⁹¹ After Ben Ali’s flight, the government moved rapidly to prosecute Ben ‘Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, on various charges of massive financial corruption. In June 2011, a Tunisian criminal court sentenced Ben ‘Ali and Trabelsi in absentia to 35 years’ imprisonment for bribery, embezzlement, and misappropriation of public funds, along with a $65 million fine.¹⁹² Further, the current government confiscated the assets of 110 family members of Ben ‘Ali and launched a committee to recover the assets smuggled globally.¹⁹³ Despite this progress, young Tunisians, concerned that the uprising will present yet another chance for corrupt political and top- government officials to misuse their power, remain cautious about politics and the current elite.¹⁹⁴ Corruption—especially financial and political—is of such concern to Tunisian youths that, in a recent focus group survey shown by the National Democratic Institute, their primary advice for the government did not concern constitutional reform, but rather corruption and unemployment.¹⁹⁵

Widespread corruption under Ben ‘Ali was one of the prime factors that fueled unrest among the Tunisian people and eventually triggered the Jasmine Revolution in 2011. The “democratization of corruption” is putting Tunisia’s transition at risk, touching every level of the country’s economic, political, and security systems. Article 14 of the Tunisian constitution of 2014 took due consideration of this, as the fight against corruption is preserved as a national objective. However, corruption remains endemic in Tunisia—the regional comparison issued by (TI) in its Corruption Perceptions Index still only accords the country a medium ranking.¹⁹⁶ Recently, the current administration set up a highly active anti-corruption agency, “Instance Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption (INLUCC),” to tackle administrative corruption, but it has only limited financial and personnel resources at its disposal, and is not fully independent of the government.¹⁹⁷ Additionally, anti-corruption legislation has been passed, including a law protecting whistle-blowers and one tackling money laundering and fraudulent actions via launching concrete measures, for instance ordering the arrest of numerous public officials charged with public service corruption.¹⁹⁸ In the same vein, the Tunisian parliament approved a law to combat illicit enrichment, a step designed to strengthen the government’s fight against widespread corruption, ensure transparency, and preserve public money in the country. The law will force the president, ministers, senior officials in the public sector, independent bodies, banks, judges, security forces, journalists, and unions to declare their property and allow the national group to scrutinize the unidentified wealth that has been attained illegitimately.¹⁹⁹

Nevertheless, the country’s transition is not complete and regardless of a growing divide between the Tunisian people and their government, there is one issue on which everyone can agree: the need to abolish corruption. In this regard, the EU countries have reinforced relationships with the Tunisian government and civil society across a range of issues, including political, socio-economic, and security reform.²⁰⁰ The current government launched a series of independent commissions to investigate corruption and recover stolen assets; it combined economic crimes into the country’s transitional justice process, endorsed numerous laws aimed at fighting administrative corruption, and created good governance cells within every public institution.²⁰¹

In a corrupt economy, every economic transaction has a corruption tax—an amount of money that is being tapped away from the state. High levels of corruption also deter much-needed private sector investment, reducing the trust of potential foreign and domestic investors and creating needless risks for firms.²⁰² Extensive corruption typically reduces the quality of government institutions, mainly the bureaucracy, because when bureaucrats become familiar with engaging in corrupt performances, it becomes tougher to implement public policies that are in the best interest of the state and citizenry.²⁰³ The quality of administrative services also worsens, as administrative corruption directly threatens security by providing opportunities for traffickers— of weapons, drugs, and humans—to bring illicit goods into the country.²⁰⁴ Thus, the question is, how is corruption being addressed? The Tunisian government and civil society have undertaken many initiatives aimed at attacking corruption, especially in public service. Several official and nonofficial bodies have been created since 2011 to address both past wrongdoings and prevent future ones, and numerous laws have been passed to prevent corruption or punish corrupt persons and entities. However, the primary anti-corruption bodies are lacking the financial and human resources to carry out their mandates. And many of the laws have either not been implemented or do not provide adequate accountability mechanisms to effectively deter corrupt behavior.

Legal Measures and Institutional Bodies Reform

Tunisia has been using many legislative apparatuses to address past corruption and deter future activity. “While not directly tied to corruption, the 2011 electoral law (Decree 1089) banned some former officials . . . from running for public office.”²⁰⁵ One of the most significant government measures, economically, is the confiscation committee, created by Decree Law 2011-13 on March 14, 2011.²⁰⁶ “Additionally, . . . anti-corruption officials (through a “good governance cell”) were placed in every public institution, including every ministry, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are embedded across the government.”²⁰⁷ Legislation to address specific aspects of corruption has also been passed (or is being developed), including laws on bribery, access to information, and corruption reporting and whistleblower protection.²⁰⁸ A new legislation has been approved that requires public disclosure of income and assets and criminalizes illicit gains and conflicts of interest. “Tunisia has also adopted various electronic measures to prevent corruption, both officially and through civil society, including the Open Budget portal and an online tool called Marsoum 41, which was created to enable citizens to directly request public documents.”²⁰⁹ In 2014, Tunisia also joined the Open Government Partnership, “a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance.”²¹⁰ Also, a ministerial memorandum established the Financial Judiciary Pole to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate corruption cases, and granted the court jurisdiction over complex economic and financial crimes as a judicial body through Basic Law 57/2016.²¹¹

The effort to provide justice for victims of corruption during the pre-revolutionary period has been carried out through Tunisia’s official transitional justice process. The process was unique in that it was the “first to formally recognize socio-economic harms as violations warranting justice and material reparation.”²¹² The Commission of Inquiry into Misappropriation and Corruption, was established to deal with corruption and embezzlement of public funds by several public officials. It is financially and administratively independent, comprised of fifteen members selected by a parliamentary committee. It can arbitrate and conduct criminal retribution for past economic crimes. Overall, Tunisia’s legal measures provide a strong framework to combat corruption, but many of them are not fully implemented or enforced. It is still too early to assess whether the laws, once implemented, will be effective at deterring corruption.

Despite such advances in the fight against corruption in Tunisia, much remains to be done at policy level. Critics fear that the current government lacks the capacity and authority needed to tackle corruption vigorously and effectively. Moreover, the national anti-corruption strategy adopted by the Tunisian Government has not been put into practice. Also, the judiciary still suffers from poor financial and personnel resources and non-independence which, in turn, confines its abilities to contest corruption professionally. As a result of these concerns, Tunisians and the civil society organizations have voted to include a clause guaranteeing transparency and open government in the country’s new 2012 constitution.²¹³ Time will tell whether Ben ‘Ali’s ill- gotten gains and funds can be forfeited and returned back to Tunisia and Tunisians, and whether Tunisia’s current government is as committed to the integrity, transparency and accountability as their constituents so passionately desire. It is highly recommended to raise public awareness of corruption and of corrupt practices in one’s immediate environment among the staff of regional and local administrations, elected representatives of regional and local authorities, civil society organizations, and citizens at local level.

VI. The Future and the Way Ahead: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Üstüner and Yavuz stated that “participation, transparency and accountability are three interrelated pillars of good governance process.” Public accountability requires both the essential legal-structural measures and their genuine implementation. In terms of legal-structural actions, most of the countries have taken steps towards fighting administrative corruption. In Egypt, for example, the Auditing Central Agency (ACA), the Ministry of Urban Planning, and Administrative Reform along with the Accountability State Authority (ASA) work together for this purpose. Generally speaking, the application of accountability (national experiences would suggest) is still a work-in-progress, a road ahead. Central state traditions, insufficient transparency actions, inadequate will and determination from the citizens, political control over bureaucratic bodies, along with improper information channels and objective act and implementation measurements seem to be mutual problems hampering public accountability in the MENA region; however, there is still hope for the future.

For many nations, the problem is to generate or release public anger at corruption and at the failure to deal with it. The public can become inactive if it believes that administrative corruption is intrinsic in the very nature of government; that the state goes its own way and is not receptive to public demands; that everyone in private or public life is out for themselves anyway; and that plotting is the normal practice of governments. These turn out to be self- fulfilling views as they kill the political demand for trustworthiness and morality by making it seem simple, declining public spiritedness and hope. Yet, without a powerful public demand for robust action against corruption, political leaders will not act against it, and a failure to act strengthens public skepticism. So, the cycle goes on and on.

A government that wants to dismiss these self-fulfilling doubts and inspire the public demands that are the final assurance of momentous action against corruption must take dramatic movements that create hope. Internal transformations and restructurings are unlikely to have this outcome, as the public is too likely to believe that they are just for show. What is often necessary is to bring charges against the highest-level public officials who are corrupt and to intensely withdraw political control of how the charges are then handled, leaving that to judicial and prosecutorial experts. There is, at least hypothetically, a great public interest in corruption and cover-up. This is manifest all over Europe, the United States, and Japan with considerable regularity and true of Latin America. That interest may be inundated by intense concerns about a war or depression, but it is likely to be very protuberant at most times. Only an extensive and profound cynicism can eradicate that interest. It is the core duty of political leaders to avert that cynicism—distancing from the state and from any sense of public accountability— from occurring, and that is the final prerequisite for combating corruption, especially the managerial one.

Intellectuals suggested that the importance of demands from the citizens—after the Arab Spring—on transparency and responsibility particularly in the presence of robust state policies were just like similar freedoms. Further, the modern public administration and management faces moral challenges such as corruption and bribery that transcend state boundaries; causing problems such as intimidating peace, security, economic growth, environmental sustainability, human rights, and the rule of law. Ethical regulation of public administration began with the endorsement of various international agreements, including the Council of European Civil Law and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, along with the UNCAC. Middle Eastern nations should enact a legislation to launch a Board of Ethics, which represents the legal foundation of moral regulation of public administration. It has been reported—by the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)—that the structural-legal measures and punishments proved to be inadequate in fighting corruption in the region. It should be noted that the proper use of the core ideals, such as excellence, integrity, honesty, impartiality, transparency, justice, and equality, assist public officials to advance their affiliation with the community by efficient delivery of public services. Thus, governments also must fulfill their duties and commitments towards the public employees and provide the required support and services to sustain ethical and professional values in delivering public service, as the reciprocal relationship between the government and civil servants along with the severe execution of the relevant rules and sanctions are found cooperative to curve corruption.

The status of ethics in public administration in the Arab World operates through the mahsobiah and wasta (nepotism and cronyism) culture. The state of corruption in the MENA was the subject of citizens’ scrutiny during the 2011 uprisings but remains shelved thereafter, and this encourages the further institutionalization of corruption. To improve the situation—as suggested by the OECD—it is indispensable to strengthen, among other things, the culture of integrity and honesty in the civil service and to adopt and meticulous application of code of ethics for public officials. Public governance reform (re-constitution) is, commonly, a key policy aspiration. The drivers are, to varying extents, to generate a more operative and responsive politico-administrative structure and processes, to be better able to attract investment, to foster economic development, to create jobs, and to expand public satisfaction by addressing citizens’ rising prospects. Yet, such transformation has, generally, proved difficult to accomplish, as it threatens influential elites or collides with the current large and complex bureaucracies or with long foremost socio-cultural traditions.

In most MENA countries, the public sector is the main governance force, albeit to varying degrees. It is large, possibly distended, highly complex and certainly multi-layered, extremely formalized and vastly centralized, certainly with hierarchical command-and-control administrative processes. It should be noted that public bureaucracies are the employer of preference, because they offer secure tenure jobs in settings superior to those offered in other sectors, and the governmental budgeting processes remain federal and concentrated. Governments in the MENA generally prefer to keep the outdated incremental line-item attitude to budgeting because political stability entails a strong patron-client construction, which is reliant upon budget processes ensuring benefits for specific social groups. This is not to suggest that public sector reform has not been sought. In Egypt, for instance, public administration reform should be “with the objective of having a more effective and responsive administrative structure” and “many of these transitions remain incomplete, despite their strong presence in official statements and state documents.”

Accordingly, the significant government decentralization; the gradual authorization of the legislature to review public administration; the adoption of managerialist philosophies of the new public management to improve the delivery of public services; along with the introduction of user fees for public services and the performance-based budgeting, are highly recommended to be implemented in the region. Also, there has been emerging evidence on how E-governance and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) transformed the operation of public administration to achieve efficiency in service delivery and expands the economic growth in both developed and developing countries. However, both the quality and quantity of delivering online services needs to be at the center of attention shifted from delivering online services to building a just society, a “new” Middle East. Despite these constraints, the current governments can take several actions to address corruption that do not require tremendous effort or resources, such as implementing and enforcing existing laws and depersonalizing anti-corruption processes. Other tasks—such as digitizing government processes, streamlining the bureaucracy, and creating sustainable exit strategies from the informal economy—are long-term endeavors that will require significant financial resources and a large assist from the international community. All of these recommendations require real political will—something that the public feelings are lacking, particularly after the cabinet reshuffle.

One of the most effective ways to prevent both short and long-term corruption is for the government to engage with civil society. Civil society has proven that it is dedicated to this fight. With appropriate funding from the international community, civil society can push the government to enforce and implement the current legal framework and work with the private sector to develop tools to digitize government processes. The Egyptian and Tunisian governments should: (a) implement and enforce existing laws, as the prevailing legal framework is adequate to fight the proliferation of corruption, however, many laws have not been implemented; (b) enforce the asset declaration laws as constitutionally mandated, as public servants are required to declare their assets when they take office; (c) expedite transformations to guarantee a fully independent judiciary to help enforce existing legislations; (d) depersonalize the fight against corruption because government’s should focus their anti-corruption efforts on processes, not individuals, to ensure that anti-corruption measures are long lasting and sustainable. While the initial arrests under the war on corruption are important to send a signal to other dishonest actors that corruption will not be tolerated, a sustainable anti-corruption policy must dismantle the structures that permitted corruption; (e) digitalize the government processes via the private sector and international community. The government should provide electronic access to public services at the local and national levels. This will help update the bureaucracy and remove opportunities for bribery at all public levels; (f) strengthen the digital initiative via an initiative to digitize public and private sectors, provide internet access for every home, creating many jobs; (g) use the online national identification system to help capture the informal sector to help the government recoup lost tax revenue and help marginalized folks receive social services; (i) invest heavily in battling corruption in the border regions with significant help from the international community; and finally, (j) continue to strengthen civil society and ensure a free media, and support the expansion of watchdog organizations at the local level, as the decentralization process begins.

That dysfunctional public administration and poor governance go hand in hand is unquestionable; but the question is, is good governance provisioned upon having strong state administration? Definitely, a set of robust state institutions can deliver wise decision-making, public policy outcomes, and public services beneficial to a society, but it can also be tyrannical, leading to shrink the quality of societal governance. The issues are the proper and suitable governance roles of the state, the marketplace, civil society, and its citizens. How this balance is determined deeply and profoundly affects the nature of common governance and public administration in the MENA region.

Egypt and Tunisia have both taken steps to address systemic corruption. These phases, however, must result in diminished corruption in order to satisfy the electorate that democracy and the rule of law have taken root. Moreover, given the degree of corruption in the MENA, evolving governments in this region must look beyond the Arab and Muslim world for role models in highlighting the issue. Several countries offer great examples of democratic cultures boosted by effective government agencies with the power to inspect corruption independent of the police. Social science, international legal power, and common opinion view corruption as intimate to democracy; the Arab Spring’s recent leadership should treat it as such.

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¹✕ See Martin Keulertz et al., Material Factors for the MENA Region: Data Sources, Trends and Drivers, MENARA (Dec. 2016), http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_cp_3.pdf (“Several underlying material fundamentals with wide-reaching effects on the geopolitical order of the whole region have contributed to the dramatic changes affecting the political landscape of the MENA. For example, food price volatility caused by international market developments vis-à-vis local mismanagement of natural resources, the environment and the economy were one driver of the discontent that contributed to regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Zurayk 2011). However, other factors contributed as well, such as population growth, energy insecurity, the role of the military and general economic indicators. Understanding these material factors is crucial for informing other Work Packages that deal with political and cultural factors, social values, political formations, war, conflict, revolution or transition.”).

²✕ See Middle East and North Africa, WORLD BANK GROUP, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena (last visited June 20, 2021Feb. 22, 2021), (“Fifteen million people have fled their homes, many to fragile or economically strapped countries, as Jordan, Lebanon, Djibouti and Tunisia, giving rise to the major refugee crisis since World War II.”).

³✕ See generally Senay Acikgoz, Mohamed Sami Ben Ali & Merter Mert, Sources of Economic Growth in Mena Countries: Technological Progress, Physical or Human Capital Accumulations? in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 27, 27-28 (Ben Ali & Mohamed Sami eds., 2016) (“Economic growth is an increase in the productive capacity of an economy. The productive capacity can be increased by an increase in factors of production, such as capital, labor, or the level of technology . . . . In light of this main concern, sources of growth should also be investigated for the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) . . . explores the sources of economic growth for the MENA countries and contributes to the debate over whether they stem from technological progress, physical capital accumulation, or human capital accumulation, and deliberates on the identifying assumption used in growth accounting theories.”).

⁴✕ See generally id. (reporting by public administration scientists show that some Arab countries can be described – in terms of their effective governance capacity – as follows: vibrant states include, United Arab Emirates and Turkey; decayed states include, Egypt and Jordan; fragile states, as Lebanon, and failed states such as Libya and Yemen. It should be noted that each country has adopted an approach to public administration that reflects its history, its cultural, geo-political, socio-economic, and conflictive atmospheres).

⁵✕ See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 3.

⁶✕ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc A/810, at 71 (1948), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/b1udhr.htm.

⁷✕ Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/cairodeclaration.html ; see GUY S. GOODWINGILL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS: NEW EXPANDED EDITION 82–85 (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 2006) (NOTING THAT REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, HALLMARKED BY OPPOSING PARTIES, PERIODIC ELECTIONS, AND WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION, IS CONSIDERED THE BASIS OF DEMOCRACY).

⁸✕ J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967); see also David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C² Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 594, 594–96 (2000).

⁹✕ United Nations Convention Against Corruption, pmbl.., Dec. 14, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/58/422,, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374b9524.html.

¹⁰✕ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).

¹¹✕ See Brian C. Harms, Note, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 159, 164–66 (2000).

¹²✕ See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 455, 457 (1999).

¹³✕ See generally Michael Johnston, Fighting Systemic Corruption: Social Foundations for Institutional Reform, 10 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 85, 85, 87, 89, 91 (1998). (accordingly, social science and legal research has also shown that democratic systems tend to diminish corrupt and fraudulent activities).

¹⁴✕ Natalia Melgar, Máximo Rossi & Tom W. Smith, The Perception of Corruption, 22 INT’L J. PUB. OP. RESEARCH, no. 1, 2010, at 120, 120–26..2

¹⁵✕ Ji-Young Kim, "Bowling Together" Isn’t a Cure-All: The Relationship Between Social Capital and Political Trust in South Korea, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. NO. 2, 2005 AT 193, 196–200, 202–03. Similarly, a 2007 study of embezzlement in local, Indonesian elections designated that voting serves as a public “audit,” by which the public assesses elected officials and holds them liable. See Benjamin A. Olken, Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia, 115 J. POLIT. ECON. no. 2, 2007, at 200, 200–02 (2007). Political corruption is the use of powers by government officials or their network contacts for illegitimate private gain. An officeholder’s illegal act constitutes political corruption only if the act directly relates to official duties, is done under color of law, or involves trading in influence. See Stratos Pahis, Corruption in Our Courts: What It Looks Like and Where It Is Hidden, 118 YALE LAW J. 1900, 1903, 1905 (2009).

¹⁶✕ See Gabriella R. Montinola & Robert W. Jackman, Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. Spring 2002, at 147, 151. See generally MOHAMED ‘ARAFA, TOWARDS A NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW IN EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, EGYPTIAN ANTI-BRIBERY LAW, AND ISLAMIC LAW, 101–03, 158–60, 223–34 (2013). Also, the confrontational nature of a multi-party system chills corruption: a competitive electoral process can incentivize politicians to reveal the dishonest behavior of their opponents and to be truthful themselves. Gamal Essam El-din, ‘New Anti-Corruption Law Should Improve Egypt’s Position on Anti-Corruption Index,’ Speaker Tells MPs, AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 10, 2017), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/278560/ Egypt/Politics-/New-anticorruption-law-should-improve-Egypts-posit.aspx (“Egypt’s parliament approved . . . amendments to the law regulating the Administrative Watchdog Authority (AWA), which is in charge of fighting corruption. . . . The amendments give the ACA more powers to tighten control on corruption and help the government’s 2014 National Anti-Corruption Committee fight nepotism and reinforce accountability in government circles . . . .”).

¹⁷✕ Mark E. Warren, What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 328, 328 (2004).

¹⁸✕ JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 606–07 (1984); Reagan’s Circuit Nominees Confirmed in 1985, 8 LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 1986, at 6 (detailing that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Judge Noonan).

¹⁹✕ See generally ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988).

²⁰✕ See id at 23.

²¹✕ See generally Robert A. Sparling, Impartiality and the Definition of Corruption, 66 POL. STUD. J.,, 376, 377 no. 2 (2018).

²²✕ See, e.g., Robert Klitgaard, What Can Be Done?, UNESCO COURIER, June 1996, at 36.

²³✕See NOONAN, supra note 18, at 702–03.

²⁴✕ See NOONAN supra note 18, at 685, 704–05; see also KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at x–xi, 46–48.

²⁵✕ NOONAN supra note 18, at 685, 704–05; see also KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at x–xi, 10–11, 46–48.

²⁶✕ It should be noted that some of the poorest corruption has taken place under highly autocratic governments including the Communist governments of the Soviet Union, China, and the authoritarian governments of regimes such as those in Zaire, Nigeria, and various countries in the Middle East.

²⁷✕ See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & Marriane M. Jennings, The Ethics of Slotting: Is this Bribery, Facilitation Marketing or Just Plain Competition?, 20 J. BUSINESS ETHICS 3, 207–15 (1999).

²⁸✕ See, e.g., id. (noting that both groups are victims of the fraudulent behavior).

²⁹✕ NOONAN, supra note 18, at 702–03.

³⁰✕ KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at 47.

³¹✕ See KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at 30–36.

³²✕ See Klitgaard, supra note 22, at 34.

³³✕ See generally Klitgaard, supra note 22, at 34.

³⁴✕ See NOONAN, supra note 18.

³⁵✕ See Klitgaard, supra note 22.

³⁶✕ See NOONAN, supra note 18.

³⁷✕ See generally KLITGAARD, supra note 19.

³⁸✕ See generally Klitgaard, supra note 22.

³⁹✕ Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), (transcript in Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings 1859-1865, Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., Library of Am. 1989 at 536).

⁴⁰✕ See id.

⁴¹✕ Philip B. Heymann, Democracy and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 323, 328 (1996).

⁴²✕ Id. (stating that campaign contributions are rarely unbiased, as candidates know from whom they come and why, and candidates remember that they will need them again).

⁴³✕ Id.

⁴⁴✕ See generally James L. Perry, Revisiting the Core of Our Good Government Ethos, 75 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 186, 186– 87(2015).

⁴⁵✕ See id.

⁴⁶✕ Heymann, supra note 41, at 329.

⁴⁷✕ Robert Coulson ‘Systemic Corruption’ a Daunting Challenge in a Globalized Era, Rᴀᴅɪᴏ Fʀᴇᴇ Eᴜʀ./Rᴀᴅɪᴏ Lɪʙᴇʀᴛʏ (Dec. 9, 2010), https://www.rferl.org/a/corruption_systemic_soviet_afghanistan/2243654.html.

⁴⁸✕ Juliet Sorensen, Ideals without Illusions: Corruption and the Future of a Democratic North Africa, 10 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 202, 204 (2012).

⁴⁹✕ Id. at 203.

⁵⁰✕ Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.transparency.org/en/news/corruption-perceptions-index-2017#. In the same vein, a 2011 report by the advocacy group, Global Financial Integrity, acknowledged that four of the top 10 countries in the world for illegitimate financial flows – including monies for bribery, financial fraud, and tax evasion – were Gulf nations.

⁵¹✕ THEODORE C. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 22 (1965).

⁵²✕ See generally Mohamed ‘Arafa, Towards a Culture for Accountability: A New Dawn for Egypt. 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 1 (2011).

⁵³✕ See M. Patrick Yingling & Mohamed ‘Arafa, After the Revolution: Egypt’s Changing Forms of Corruption, 2 BALT. J. INT’L L. 23, 50 (2013).

⁵⁴✕ See generally id.

⁵⁵✕ Howard Whitton, ‘Implementing Effective Ethics Standards in Government and the Civil Service’ 1, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Feb. 2001), https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/35521740.pdf. See generally Walid ElGammal, Abdul- Nasser El-Kassar & Leila Canaan Messarra, Corporate Ethics, Governance and Social Responsibility in MENA Countries, EMERALD INSIGHT (Sept. 13, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-03-2017-0287.

⁵⁶✕ Whitton, supra note 55. See generally Guenter Heidenhof, Strengthening Governance and Institutions in MENA: Issues and Priorities, MENA KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING 114 (Jan. 2014), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/20555 (“In MENA, governance is a critical part of the regional strategy and plays an important role at the sector and topical level in all four pillars of the regional strategy. A credible system of ‘good governance’ has various dimensions which, in broad terms, include: (i) political accountability; (ii) checks and balances; (iii) a robust civil society and media; (iv) effective public sector management, and (v) decentralization and local participation . . .”).

⁵⁷✕ Whitton, supra note 55. See generally Bo Rothstein & Nicholas Sorak, Ethical Codes for the Public Administration: A Comparative Survey, UNIV. OF GOTHENBURG (Nov. 2017), https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/54302/1/ gupea_2077_54302_1.pdf (“Interest in the state ‘machinery’ has grown a lot during the last three decades. This is in part due to new empirical research showing that what goes on ‘inside’ the state’s administrative machinery has important implications both for the legitimacy of the political system as well as for most measures of human wellbeing.”).

⁵⁸✕ See generally Heidenhof, supra note 56; Shamip Rijal, Employment Challenges in Nepal, Wordpress(Sept. 6, 2020), https://milanrijal.wordpress.com/2020/09/06/employment-challenges-in-nepal-by-shamip-rijal/ (according to leading populism scholar, Jan-Werner Mueller, populist governance contains three main features: (a) attempts to hijack established institutions; (b) corruption and “mass clientelism”, and (c) efforts to systematically suppress civil society).

⁵⁹✕ See generally CAROL W. LEWIS & STUARD C. GILMAN, THE ETHICS CHALLENGE IN PUBLIC SERVICE: A PROBLEM-SOLVING GUIDE (3d ed. 2012).

⁶⁰✕ See generally Judith Lichtenberg, What are Codes of Ethics For? (2009).

⁶¹✕ See id. at 6.

⁶²✕ Id. at 7.

⁶³✕ See Howard Whitton, Implementing Effective Ethics Standards in Government and the Civil Service, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 1, 2-4 ( 2001).; John Dixon, Shahjahan Bhuiyan & Yılmaz Üstüner, Public Administration in the Middle East and North Africa, INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 759, 759–764 (2018) (highlighting the status of public administration in six profiled countries – Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey–in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and exploring public administration as a concept—the diversity of guiding general principles that determines how governments administer the affairs of state in the context of their governance frameworks—and as praxis—the diversity of public administration structures, procedures and practice, and reform initiatives).

⁶⁴✕ Whitton, supra note 63, at 2; Dixon, supra note 63, at 761.

⁶⁵✕ Whitton, supra note 63, at 2. See generally Professionalism and Ethics in Public Service: Issues and Practices in Selected Regions, UNITED NATIONS 3–59 (2000), https://publicadministration.un.org/publications/content/PDFs/ ELibrary% 20Archives/2000%20Professionalism%20and%20Ethics%20in%20the%20Public%20Service.pdf (discussing comprehensive examination of corruption and ethics throughout the world).

⁶⁶✕ See Martha S. Feldman, Anne M. Khademian, Helen Ingram & Anne S. Schneider, Ways of Knowing and Inclusive Management Practices, 66 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 89 (2006).

⁶⁷✕ STUART C. GILMAN, ETHICS CODES AND CODES OF CONDUCT AS TOOLS FOR PROMOTING AN ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE: COMPARATIVE SUCCESSES AND LESSONS 10 (2005).

⁶⁸✕ Id.

⁶⁹✕ TERRY L. COOPER, THE RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR: AN APPROACH TO ETHICS FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE 21 (2012).

⁷⁰✕ It should be noted that values are general ethical obligations while principles are the moral conditions or behaviors we expect. Unfortunately, this can become perplexing in everyday language. For example, many times “core values” or “concrete values” are terms used instead of principles, but they should be envisioned to inform principles. Therefore, it is not uncommon for codes to begin with a value (integrity) and then make the value real in principle (don’t use your public office for private gain). Stuart Gilman, Ethics Codes and Codes of Conduct as Tools for Promoting an Ethical and Professional Public Service: Comparative Successes and Lessons, OECD 10 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/35521418.pdf.

⁷¹✕ Carol W. Lewis, Ethical Norms in Public Service: A Framework for Analysis, CITESEERX https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.119.9708&rep=rep1&type=pdf (last visited March 3, 2021).

⁷²✕ See generally id. at 7–8, 11, 17.

⁷³✕ VIRENDER SINGH BAGEL, ETHICS: INTEGRITY AND APTITUDE 370 (2017).

⁷⁴✕ Id. at 370–71.

⁷⁵✕ For instance, Secretary General Kofi Annan was broadly criticized because of his son’s connection in the United Nations’ Iraqi “food for oil” program. Even though his son is an adult, working in the private sector, the appearance – if not the reality of using his father’s name for influence – can be upsetting to any public official. See Richard

⁷⁶✕ Though codes are significant they must be grounded in organizations that both respect and support moral and proper behavior. Gilman, supra note 70, at 12.

⁷⁷✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 2 (Noting that in the West, the insufficiency of ethical codes within civil service regimes still equate “Public Sector Ethics” with anti-corruption efforts, and limit their engagement with professional practice matters to a minimalist written Code of Conduct (Ethics), which is usually concerned with banning conflict of interests and self-dealing, and encouraging political and other form of impartiality, and (increasingly) service to the society); see also Gilman, supra note 70, at 25–26.

⁷⁸✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 3 (Explaining that moral conduct and corruption in the public sector are two sides of one coin. To the extent that an organization succeeds in strengthening its own moral climate internally, and that which it works in externally, (for example, by including suppliers and contractors within the scope of an ethics program), it diminishes the acceptability of corruption. Conversely, control chances for corruption and you make room for moral practices to become recognized.) (emphasis added)).

⁷⁹✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 3; see Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, Battling Corruption within a Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 397, 399–401 (2011).

⁸⁰✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 3; see, e.g., WILLIAM P. OLSEN, THE ANTI-CORRUPTION HANDBOOK: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR BUSINESS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2010) (explaining possible measures and tools for a competitive advantage in the global markets).

⁸¹✕ Ethics & Compliance Initiative, Developing an Organizational Code of Conduct, ECI, https://www.ethics.org/resources/free-toolkit/code -of-conduct/ (last visited Sep. 1, 2021).

⁸²✕ Id.

⁸³✕ Id.

⁸⁴✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 4. See generally Suresh Misra, Strengthening of Ethical and Moral Values in Governance, INDIAN INST. OF PUBLIC ADMIN. (2016), https://docplayer.net/36171710-Strengthening-of-ethical- andmoral- values-in-governance.html (“The notion of “Good Governance” has become the buzzword these days in wake of globalization. Good governance is commonly described as a style of governance that is efficient, effective, responsive, corruption free and citizen friendly for ensuring people’s trust in government and promoting social harmony, political stability and economic development. Good governance is strictly connected with institutionalized values such as democracy, observance of human rights and rule of law and greater efficiency within the public sector. The current concern for good governance and building public trust in administration has generated the need for following ethical and moral principles, which emphasize on “justice,” “equity,” “conscience,” and “moral unambiguity” and give a prominent place to the idea that public servants are ultimately responsible to the people.”).

⁸⁵✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 5.

⁸⁶✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 5.

⁸⁷✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 8–9 (Meanwhile, such laws protect the reputations of innocent individuals and government establishments by providing significant penalties for knowingly false or malicious ‘disclosures.’ A disclosure will only be protected if it is made to a proper authority, and if it is based on a reasonable belief, held on reasonable justifications, that the disclosure is correct); see ‘Arafa, supra note 16, at 322–23.

⁸⁸✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 9; see Shahjahan H. Bhuiyan, Can Democratic Governance Be Achieved in Egypt?, 38 INT’L J. OF PUBLIC ADMIN. 7, 496–509 (2015) (exploring the status of three key pillars of democratic governance in the context of the January 2011 People’s Revolution and subsequent political developments: (1) inclusive participation; (2) responsive institutions; and (3) adherence to international practices and principles. Protections devoted to the disclosure procedure should not be open to abuse, a person who knowingly commits a false public interest disclosure, commits an act of misconduct and will be punished administratively if he/she is a civil servant and criminally if the person a private citizen.).

⁸⁹✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 9 (The constraint on protection to disclosures to a ‘proper authority’ efficiently forbids disclosures to the media and is envisioned to discourage malicious attempts to damage reputations. Individuals should not be able to disclose the identity of a whistleblower without proper authority’s permission.); see Lynn S. Paine, Rohit Deshpandeé, Joshua D. Margolis & Kim Eric Bettcher, Up to Code: Does Your Company’s Conduct Meet World-Class Standards?, 83 HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2005), https://hbr.org/2005/12/up-to-code-doesyour- companys-conduct-meet-world-class-standards.

⁹⁰✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 10; see Jolanta Palidauskaitek, Codes of Ethics in Transitional Democracies: A Comparative Perspective, 8 J. PUB. INTEGRITY 1, 35–48 (2006); Veronica Besmer, The Legal Character of Private Codes of Conduct: More than Just a Pseudo-Formal Gloss on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 279, 280 (2006); see, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic Strategy, 103 VA. L. REV. 8, 1634–37 (2017). See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006); Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability and Ethics: Reconsidering the Relationships, 6 INT’L J. OF ORG. THEORY & BEHAV. 3, 405–41 (2003).

⁹¹✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 10 (Recently, it has been argued that it is important to ensure ‘value for money’ (‘VFM’) management and control plans to ensure that public monies are controlled in a way to maximize the benefit to the public, and that expenditure controls are not misused by personal or private interests).

⁹²✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 10; see Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛᴏʀᴀᴛᴇ Fᴏʀ Pᴜʙ. Gᴏᴠᴇʀɴᴀɴᴄᴇ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇʀʀɪᴛᴏʀɪᴀʟ Dᴇᴠ., Oᴠᴇʀᴄᴏᴍɪɴɢ Bᴀʀʀɪᴇʀs ᴛᴏ Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ Sɪᴍᴘʟɪғɪᴄᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Sᴛʀᴀᴛᴇɢɪᴇs: Gᴜɪᴅᴀɴᴄᴇ ғᴏʀ Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ Mᴀᴋᴇʀs 5 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/https://www.oecd.org/ regreform/42112628.pdf.

⁹³✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 10. See generally ‘Arafa, supra note 16, at 48–49 (explaining that petty corruption includes public officers using discretionary power to receive bribes).

⁹⁴✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 10 (noting that for credibility purposes, the integrity test that is set must be truthful and accurate, reflect the circumstances of the official’s position regarding his/her official duties, and be carried out in a way that the test reflects any entrapment, and this process must be subject to independent audit to prevent abuse any sort of peddling in influence).

⁹⁵✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 10–11; Roberta Ann Johnson & Michael E. Kraft, Bureaucratic Whistleblowing and Policy Change, 43 W. POL. Q. 849, 849–55 (1990).

⁹⁶✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 11. See generally JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL.,, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE (3rd ed. 2003); Carla Miller, The Tail Wagging the Dog: Institutional Corruption and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO), EDEMAND J. SAFRA, HARV. CTR. ETHICS (Aug. 20, 2013), https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/tailwagging- dog (“In fact, there is an ethics revolving-door phenomenaon. Those government employees intimately familiar with the complex ethics regulations are highly sought after in the private sector, the ‘ethics industry.’”).

⁹⁷✕ See Johnston, supra note 13 at 85, 87–89, 91.

⁹⁸✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 11; see Jennifer Daehler, Professional Versus Moral Responsibility in the Developing World, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 241–42 (1995) (outlining the ethical responsibilities of a lawyer including a duty to report to the Department of Justice when a client is violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)).

⁹⁹✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 11–12 (In the Western public administrative systems, attempts to hire or employ friends’ relatives and cronys contrary to merit-based legal measures are considered as a serious form of corruption, and lead to dismissals and prosecution criminally of public officials (including ministers) who engaged in such practices. Arbitrary dismissal from office through the intervention of any authority (ministers for example), is illegitimate, and may be treated as a form of office abuse (power misuse).).

¹⁰⁰✕ See generally Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption in Comparative Perception, in ARVIND K. JAIN, ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, (Arvind K. Jain ed., 1998) (comparing perceptions of corruption across different countries).

¹⁰¹✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 12 (In this respect, it is vital that civil service salaries should reflect the cost of an adequate standard of living to minimize public officials’ temptation to be corrupt, and to maximize the service’s ability to attract and retain talented personnel who can contribute to their community. In setting the payment, actual and genuine documented performance play a fundamental role in case to be raised via bonuses or other mechanisms.).

¹⁰²✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 12; ‘Arafa, supra note 16, at 410–11 (“Ethical leadership is essential if codes of conduct are to be adhered to and are to be used to successfully regulate the moral behavior of employees. If employees consider corporate leadership unethical, codes of conduct will fall into contempt. Therefore, codes are only as good as the leaders who advocate for them.”).

¹⁰³✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 5. See generally SAM AGERE & IBBO MANDAZA, RETHINKING POLICY ANALYSIS: ENHANCING POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1999).

¹⁰⁴✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 5; see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 451, 453 (1997) (“Societies may differ in their views as to what constitutes corruption, although the concept finds universal manifestations. Experts have different perspectives on the meaning, causes, and effects of this universal phenomenon. While a few take an interdisciplinary approach, positions are more often influenced by the respective discipline.”).

¹⁰⁵✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 5 (Codes of conduct have been applied in various forms in most of the western civil service systems, however, it is vital that enduring professional training, active institutionalization by management, and committed leadership by political and administrative elites, be preserved or strengthened if such codes are to be worth more than the paper on which they are printed. At the end, the codes have been designed as a corrective tool to official corruption, abuse of office, influence peddling, and conflicts of interest.).

¹⁰⁶✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 6 (referring to red-tapism which would include excessive regulation or rigid conformity to formal rules that are considered redundant or bureaucratic and hinder or prevent action or decisionmaking).

¹⁰⁷✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 5; see e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005) (Thompson draws a distinction between “individual” corruption and “institutional” corruption. It is a subtle, but important one. When an executive takes a bribe, for example, in return for some favor, and assuming the favor relates in no way to the executive’s job description, we can say that the exchange serves no institutional purpose and is therefore a matter of straightforward individual corruption. But when an executive accepts a bribe to further the corporation’s interests, and in doing so undermines the corporation’s espoused values and frustrates its primary purposes, then that executive becomes an agent of institutional corruption.).

¹⁰⁸✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 5; see Harms, supra note 11.

¹⁰⁹✕ How to Stop Corruption: 5 Key Ingredients, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.transparency.org /news/feature/how_to_stop_corruption_5_key_ingredients.

¹¹⁰✕ Id.

¹¹¹✕ Id. See generally LEO HUBERTS, THE INTEGRITY OF GOVERNANCE: WHAT IT IS, WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT IS DONE AND WHERE TO GO ch. 8 (2014).

¹¹²✕ How to Stop Corruption: 5 Key Ingredients, supra note 109.

¹¹³✕ How to Stop Corruption: 5 Key Ingredients, supra note 109. See generally Philip Joyce, The Culture of Ethics That the Public Sector Needs, GOVERNING (Oct. 15, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.governing.com/archive/ col-culture -ethics-public-sector-needs.html. Likewise, the Norwegian, UK, and Ukrainian governments have all approved laws requiring corporations to disclose information about their owners, although these have yet to come into force.

¹¹⁴✕ See generally Alex Hemmer, Note, Civil Servant Suits, 124 YALE L.J. 758 (2014),; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682–87 (1975).

¹¹⁵✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 6. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PROGRESS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: CASE STUDIES ON POLICY REFORM, 3 (2010).

¹¹⁶✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 6 (“In either case, maladministration by a public official is thus inherently unethical. An ‘official decision’ means”—according to administrative law norms—“any decision made or supposedly made under a law or governmental policy, or an administrative procedure of a public body, by a civil servant or public official.”).

¹¹⁷✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 7.

¹¹⁸✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 7 (“Failure to report known or reasonably suspected cases may be used as grounds for disciplinary measures to be taken against civil servants.”). See generally Kennedy, supra note 12.

¹¹⁹✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 7; see Sahar Aziz, To Stop Corruption, Egypt Needs a Freedom of Information Law, HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/sahar-aziz/to-stop -corruption-egypt-_b_1538999.html (last updated July 23, 2012, 2:36 PM ET) (“Egypt is undergoing a period of enormous promise and citizen empowerment. For the first time in its history, . . . [d]espite the bumpy post-revolution road, Egyptians deserve to be acclaimed for their perseverance and commitment to democracy. But for Egypt to achieve sustainable democracy, many reforms remain to be implemented, the most important of which is public access to information that permits meaningful government accountability. Without accurate information, Egyptians cannot adequately stop the rampant corruption debilitating the nation’s economy and political system. Nor can the media serve as an effective check on government abuse. Secrecy is anathema to democracy. Government dealings shrouded in secrecy was Mubarak’s modus operandi, and it ultimately led to pervasive corruption and colossal embezzlement of state resources.”).

¹²⁰✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 7 (The FOI laws as a constitutional human right are now considered indispensable to guarantee accountability of public officials and governments. The best practice examples of these laws are in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.).

¹²¹✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 7 (establishing that this provision is a major influence on the integrity and probity of official decision making, good governance, and the deterrence and detection of corruption and Britain is one of the best nations regarding the right’s official decisions’ justification).

¹²²✕ Whitton, supra note 55, at 8.

¹²³✕ Stuart C. Gilman, Ethics Codes and Codes of Conduct as Tools for Promoting an Ethical and Professional Public Service: Comparative Successes and Lessons, WORLD BANK 16 (Winter 2005), https://www.oecd.org/mena /governance/35521418.pdf.

¹²⁴✕ Id.

¹²⁵✕ Id. at 20.

¹²⁶✕ Id.

¹²⁷✕ Id. at 22.

¹²⁸✕ Id.

¹²⁹✕ To construct this hypothetical situation, three factors are useful to consider: (1) a huge inducement, which is (2) unlikely to be detected, and (3) an atmosphere in which one would be considered unwise rather than honorable in diminishing such opportunities.

¹³⁰✕ See generally K. Abbink, B. Irlenbusch, & E. Renner, An Experimental Bribery Game, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2, 428– 54 (2002).

¹³¹✕ See generally id.

¹³²✕ See generally Paul Heywood, Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives, 45 POL. STUDIES 417, 417–35 (1997).

¹³³✕ GEORGE MOODY-STUART, GRAND CORRUPTION: HOW BUSINESS BRIBES DAMAGE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997).

¹³⁴✕ See generally id.

¹³⁵✕ See generally PETER J. PERRY, POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY (1997).

¹³⁶✕ Id.; see also Heywood, supra note 132, at 429.

¹³⁷✕ See generally Heywood, supra note 132, at 425.

¹³⁸✕ Heywood, supra note 132, at 434.

¹³⁹✕ Heywood, supra note 132, at 433–34. (Corruption is likely to work in ways dictated by an organization's routines and local social conditions).

¹⁴⁰✕ See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM, 23 (1999).

¹⁴¹✕ See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, 49–50 (1997).

¹⁴²✕ See id.

¹⁴³✕ Thus, the critical features of any management device planned to avert corruption are that efforts to evade the device are more likely to be detected than corruption would be without it, and that widespread? compliance makes corruption even? more noticeable.

¹⁴⁴✕ As to carry out the previous steps: (a) general public outrage over corruption; and (b) threat of media or legislative disclosure of whatever corruption is ignored or covered up. General public outrage and the threat of media or legislative disclosure of whatever corruption is ignored or covered up will assist in carrying out these steps.

¹⁴⁵✕ Id.

¹⁴⁶✕ See generally A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Second Edition, U.S. Department of Justice (Jul. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download.

¹⁴⁷✕ They should learn to work thoroughly with specialists trained in the law, who can guide them via analytical steps without intimidating democratic institutions by mistake.

¹⁴⁸✕ See Adam Nossiter, Yet Another Unsolved Murder Stirs Corsica Against Its ‘Mafia,’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/europe/corsica-unsolved-murdersmafia. html (highlighting the ability of the mafia to infiltrate the government).

¹⁴⁹✕ See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463 (2017), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol58/iss2/3.

¹⁵⁰✕ This guarantee may not be attained by a public pressure so intense that the prosecutor will be replying or cookery to it and not to the factual merits of the case.

¹⁵¹✕ See Johnston, supra note 13, at 88–89.

¹⁵²✕ See Johnston, supra note 13, at 88–89. (noting that charges against the wealthy and the powerful are always difficult to handle efficiently, promptly, and at reasonable cost).

¹⁵³✕ See Johnston, supra note 13, at 88.

¹⁵⁴✕ Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt in Transition, CONG. RES. SERV., 5 (2011), https://www.everycrsreport.com /files/20110823_RL33003_21b7aff0b3454409a2b4f2de102012c5c2645041.pdf.

¹⁵⁵✕ James V. Grimaldi & Robert O’Harrow Jr., Egypt Prosecutor Alleges Schemes by Mubarak, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/egypt-seeks-help-to-find-mubarak-familyassetsabroad/ 2011/04/07/AFCMkZ9C_story.html.

¹⁵⁶✕ Id.

¹⁵⁷✕ See id.; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Fight for Democracy in Egypt’s Liberation Square, CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOB. AFF., 1 (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Events/FY%2011%20Events/ 02_February_11/EgyptBackgroundPaper110207.pdf (The oligarch accomplished this by “borrowing [loans] from banks controlled or directed by government appointees” and foreign banks. Then they substituted “public funds and the assets of ordinary depositors, for their own assets . . . . The Mubarak [r]egime covered up this scheme by making the Central Bank the guarantors of private banks’ investment loans. This is estimated to be in the billions of dollars.”).

¹⁵⁸✕ Grimaldi & O’Harrow Jr., supra note 155.

¹⁵⁹✕ Grimaldi & O’Harrow Jr., supra note 155.

¹⁶⁰✕ Grimaldi & O’Harrow Jr., supra note 155; see also Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, Mubarak Criminal Liability: Is it a Fair Trial After the Revolution or a Drama Series?, 1 REVISTA CONTRAPONTO 182, 227–28 (2014).

¹⁶¹✕ How Did Egypt Become So Corrupt?, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ insidestory/2011/02/201128111236245847.html.

¹⁶²✕ See generally Grimaldi & O’Harrow Jr., supra note 155.

¹⁶³✕ See generally Egypt Protests: ‘Friday of the Last Chance,’ THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.co. uk/world/middle-east-live/2011/nov/25/egypt-protest-friday-of-the-last-chance-live-updates.

¹⁶⁴✕ See generally Mohamed A. Arafa, The Unexpected Trials of Egyptian Leaders: Is It a Question of Law or Politics?, 12 US CHINA L. REV. 467, 470, 486 (2015).

¹⁶⁵✕ See generally Amr Ismail Adly, Politically-Embedded Cronyism: The Case of Post-Liberalization Egypt, 11 J. BUS. & POL. 4, 1–25 (2009) (following TI reported that the most governmental areas which are subject to corruption in the developing countries are: (1) governmental purchases (public procurements, good and services and utilities); (2) division and sale of lands and real estate; (3) tax, excise laws, and customs fees; (4) public officials’ appointments; and (5) regional rule administrations in the governorates).

¹⁶⁶✕ A Closer Look At Egypt’s Ongoing Anti-Corruption Battle, EGYPT TODAY (Aug. 10, 2018, 10:04 GMT), https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/55693/A-closer-look-at-Egypt%E2%80%99s-ongoing-anti- corruptionbattle.

¹⁶⁷✕ See ‘Arafa, supra note 16, at 113.

¹⁶⁸✕ See ‘Arafa, supra note 16, at 113 n. 593.

¹⁶⁹✕ CONST. OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 219. (“The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for monitoring and supervising markets and non-banking financial tools including capital markets, futures exchanges, insurance activities, real estate funding, financial leasing, and factoring and securitization, in the manner organized by law.”).

¹⁷⁰✕ See generally Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick, Assessing the Impact of Privatization in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PRIVATIZATION (David Park & David Saal ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, eds., 2003); see also Sabine Frerichs, Egypt’s Neoliberal Reforms and the Moral Economy of Bread: Sadat, Mubarak, Morsi, 48 REV. OF RADICAL POL. ECON. 610, 610–32 (Sept. 14, 2015), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0486613415603158; Michael Slackman, Egypt Concedes to Resistance on Privatization Push, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com /2010/06/28/world/middleeast/28egypt.html (“Back in the 1990s one of Egypt’s top economic priorities was the privatization of state-owned industries, as Egypt tried to free itself from a failing, centrally controlled economy. But the government’s enthusiasm waned over the years, and . . . the government quietly announced that the sale of state assets to individual investors had effectively ended.”).

¹⁷¹✕ See Reuters CAIRO, Egypt Detains Former Minister over Pesticides, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (July 11, 2011), https://dailynewsegypt.com/2011/07/11/egypt-detains-former-minister-over-pesticides/ (“An Egyptian investigating judge ordered a former agriculture minister detained for questioning over accusations that he allowed the import of cancer-causing pesticides . . . . Youssef Wali, who served as agriculture minister under former President Hosni Mubarak from 1982 to 2004, was also suspected of . . . .”); see also, e.g., MENA, Mubarak Agriculture Minister Wali to Stand Trial on 20 April in Corruption Case, AHRAM ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2019), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/321460/Egypt/Politics-/Mubarak-agriculture-minister-Wali-tostand- trial-o.aspx; Egypt’s Criminal Court Annuls Assets Freeze of Mubarak Era Agriculture Minister Youssef Wali, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 21, 2018), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/293197/Egypt/0/ Egypts-Criminal-Court-annuls-assets-freeze-of-Muba.aspx; Robert Springborg, Patrimonialism and Policy Making in Egypt: Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure Policy for Reclaimed Lands, 15 J. MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 49, 49–69 (Jan. 1979).

¹⁷²✕ See George Sadek, Egypt: Pending Charges Against Former President Mubarak and Potential Legal Ramifications, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/law/help/mubarak/pending-charges.php (last updated Dec. 30, 2020).

¹⁷³✕ See id. (Accordingly, one can imagine that the main forms of the corrupt activities in Egypt include: (a) issuing decisions in favor of a certain group other in violation of the public interest; (b) lack of transparency in public procurement; (c) receipt of payments (kickbacks/bribes) in return for facilitating access to governmental routine services, for example, customs and taxes, documenting and specifying fines, and (d) misappropriation, misuse or the embezzlement of public funds and public property; see, e.g., Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, Law No. 62 of 1975 (Illegal Gain/Profit-Making “Illicit Enrichment”), OFFICIAL GAZETTE (July 7, 1975), https://lawyeregypt.net/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%83%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a9- %d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d 9%86%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%85-62-%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%86%d8%a9-1975- %d8%a8%d8%b4%d8%a3%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%83%d8%b3%d8%a8-%d8%ba%d9%8a%d8%b1- %d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b4%d8%b1/ (in Arabic); Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, No. 97 of 2015, OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Aug. 20, 2015), https://site.eastlaws.com/GeneralSearch /Home/ArticlesTDetails?MasterID=1811012) (in Arabic); Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, Law No. 106 of 2013 (The Prohibition of Conflict of Interest of Public/Governmental Officials), OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/download/newlaws 20106 ل ن س/ة % 2013 قانون% 20 رقم% 20 .pdf.

¹⁷⁴✕ See Business Climate Development Strategy: Egypt Anti-Corruption, MENA-OECD INITIATIVE (Dec. 2009), https://www.oecd.org/global-relations/46341460.pdf (The prohibition applies to every director or employee under articles 103 to 111 of the Second Chapter of the Penal Code No.58 of 1937 and its successive amendments, applying to every person who has offered (paid) or aided bribe or the embezzlement of public funds, under articles 112 to 119. The law does not stop at punishing only the embezzler but goes on to penalize each servant who unintentionally causes serious harm to the entity where he or she works.).

¹⁷⁵✕ ‘ARAFA, supra note 16, at 232–33.

¹⁷⁶✕ See ‘ARAFA, supra note 16, at 101–02.

¹⁷⁷✕ See Adly, supra note 165, at 2–3.

¹⁷⁸✕ See Adly, supra note 165, at 13–14

¹⁷⁹✕ EGYPT CONST. of 2014 art. 218.

¹⁸⁰✕ See, e.g., ‘ARAFA, supra note 16, at 13–14.

¹⁸¹✕ ‘Arafa, supra note 16, at 137–38.

¹⁸²✕ Egypt Corruption Report, RISK & COMPLIANCE PORTAL, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/ countryprofiles/ egypt-corruption-report/ (last updated July 2020) (explaining that several “firms report expecting to give gifts when attempting to obtain an operating license.”).

¹⁸³✕ See Adly, supra note 165, at 13–14.

¹⁸⁴✕ Egypt Corruption Report, supra note 182, at 3 (noting that the head of the department charged with preventing tax evasion at the Egyptian Tax Authority was arrested in 2017 for attempting to solicit bribes worth EGP 2 million).

¹⁸⁵✕ ‘ARAFA, supra note 16, at 146.

¹⁸⁶✕ ‘ARAFA, supra note 16, at 90–91.

¹⁸⁷✕ Egypt Corruption Report, supra note 182, at 4–5 (explaining that there are no laws that provide for the protection of whistleblowers in Egypt).

¹⁸⁸✕ CONST. OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 151 (“The President of the Republic represents the state in foreign relations and concludes treaties and ratifies them after the approval of the House of Representatives. They shall acquire the force of law upon promulgation in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . .”).

¹⁸⁹✕ ‘ARAFA, supra note 16 (explaining that if escape from the underdevelopment of Egypt is sought, an accurate examination of its cause(s) should be undertaken with the goal of deciding the optimal role of the general public before the government in regulating economic activity and combating corruption and bribery. This ambition would be fulfilled through abandoning neo-liberal prescriptions and putting feasible legal policies into play).

¹⁹⁰✕ See generally Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & ECON. 587, 595 (1975).

¹⁹¹✕ Rym Ayadi et al., The Tunisian Revolution: An Opportunity for Democratic Transition, MEDPRO (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.medpro-foresight.eu/system/files/Tunisian%20revolution-MEDPRO.pdf.

¹⁹²✕ David D. Kirkpatrick, Ex-Tunisian President Found Guilty, in Absentia, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/middleeast/21tunisia.html.

¹⁹³✕ Borzou Daragahi, Spoils of Ben Ali Regime Remain Elusive, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/aad4a8f0-3ddf-11e1-91f3-00144feabdc0.

¹⁹⁴✕ Nicholas Collins, Voices of a Revolution: Conversations with Tunisia’s Youth, NAT’L DEM. INST. 10 (Mar. 2011), https://www.iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/conversations-with-tunisia-youth-apr-2011.pdf (explaining that youth are “concerned about individuals, political parties and civil society organizations attempting to profit from the revolution for personal gains”).

¹⁹⁵✕ Id. at 11 (“Greater transparency and accountability from decision-makers are a priority.”).

¹⁹⁶✕ German Fed. Foreign Office, Supporting the Transformation Process in Tunisia: Preventing and Fighting Corruption, giz, https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/57464.html (last visited Sep.1, 2021).

¹⁹⁷✕ Id. Recently, the administration confiscated the property and froze bank accounts of about 20 protuberant businessmen arrested on suspicion of corruption in an extraordinary government campaign against graft.

¹⁹⁸✕ Tunisia Corruption Report, RISK & COMPLIANCE PORTAL, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles /tunisia/ (last updated July 2017). Corruption had spread in all sectors including security, public tenders and health care.

¹⁹⁹✕ Tarek Amara, Tunisia Approves Illegal Enrichment Law to Strengthen Anti-Corruption Fight, REUTERS (July 17, 2018, 6:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-corruption-law/tunisia-approves-illegal-enrichmentlaw- tostrengthen- anti-corruption-fight-idUSKBN1K72QJ (stating the penalties for illicit enrichment include fines and five years’ imprisonment).

²⁰⁰✕ See generally Bob Rijkers et al., All in the Family: State Capture in Tunisia, WORLD BANK GROUP (Mar. 2014), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17726.

²⁰¹✕ SARAH CHAYES, THIEVES OF STATE: WHY CORRUPTION THREATENS GLOBAL SECURITY CH. 8, 91–100 (2015).

²⁰²✕ See Sarah Chayes, Corruption is Still Tunisia’s Challenge, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2012, 12:00 AM PT), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2012-jun-10-la-oe-chayes-tunisia-corruption-20120610-story.html.

²⁰³✕ See id.

²⁰⁴✕ Hamza Meddeb, Peripheral Vision: How Europe Can Help Preserve Tunisia’s Fragile Democracy, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/peripheral_vision_how_europe_can _preserve_tunisias_democracy_7215 (noting that lax border controls ensuing from a system of bribery can make money laundering easier and can support in the spread of terrorism. Tunisians can cross over into Libya to train with the self-proclaimed Islamic State or other terrorist organizations and go on to Iraq and Syria and can cross into Libya to prepare for attacks on Tunisian territory).

²⁰⁵✕ Sarah Yerkes & Marwan Muasher, Tunisia’s Corruption Contagion: A Transition at Risk, Cᴀʀɴᴇɢɪᴇ Eɴᴅᴏᴡᴍᴇɴᴛ ғᴏʀ Iɴᴛ'ʟ Pᴇᴀᴄᴇ (Oct. 25, 2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/25/tunisia-s-corruption-contagiontransition -at-risk-pub-73522.

²⁰⁶✕ Id.

²⁰⁷✕ Id.

²⁰⁸✕ See Tunisia Corruption Report, supra note 198.

²⁰⁹✕ Yerkes & Muasher, supra note 205.

²¹⁰✕ Rayna Stamboliyska, Opening Up Governance: OpenMENA Joins Public Consultation Process In Tunisia, Oᴘᴇɴ Kɴᴏᴡʟᴇᴅɢᴇ Fᴏᴜɴᴅ. Bʟᴏɢ (May 23, 2014), https://blog .okfn.org/2014/05/23/opening-up-governance-openmenajoins- public-consultation-process-in-tunisia/; Call for IRM National Researchers, Oᴘᴇɴ Gᴏᴠ’ᴛ P’sʜɪᴘ, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/about/careers-and -opportunities/call-for-irm-local-and-nationalresearchers/ (last visited Sep.1, 2021).

²¹¹✕ Tunisia: Enhancing Judicial Capacity to Adjudicate Financial Crimes, Nᴀᴛ'ʟ Cᴛʀ. ғᴏʀ Sᴛ. Cᴛs. Iɴᴛ'ʟ, http://www.ncscinternational.org/where-ipd-works/africa/2018/tunisia-may-2018 (last visited Sep.1, 2021).

²¹²✕ Roslyn Warren et al., Inclusive Justice: How Women Shape Transitional Justice in Tunisia and Colombia, GEORGETOWN INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY, 2017, at 1, 23, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/ uploads/2017/08/Transitional-Justice.pdf.

²¹³✕ Hanen Keskes, Tunisia: Constituent Assembly Members Vote in Favor of Transparency, ALL AFRICA (Jan. 7, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201201070044.html.